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Representation Without Documentation?: Unlawfully
Present Aliens, Apportionment, the Doctrine of
Allegiance, and the Law
Patrick J. Charles
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1867, Judge Timothy Farrar published the first edition of the
treatise entitled Manual of the Constitution of the United States of
America (the Manual). 1 A former law partner of Daniel Webster,
judge of the New Hampshire Court of Common Pleas, and president
of the New England Historical and Genealogical Society, Farrar was a
well respected legal figure in the nineteenth century. 2 Charles Sumner
described Farrar’s treatise as correcting “false interpretations” of the
Constitution and was convinced that the treatise would be “generally
accepted.” 3 Upon his death, an obituary claimed that Farrar’s treatise
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(2010); “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English
Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should be Incorporated in McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351 (2009); and the books THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
THE INTENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009);
IRRECONCILABLE GRIEVANCES: THE EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (2008),); and WASHINGTON’S DECISION: THE STORY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S
DECISION TO REACCEPT BLACK ENLISTMENTS IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, DECEMBER 31, 1775
(2006). Mr. Charles is currently a historian for the United States Air Force in Mildenhall, UK.
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Michael Hethmon and Richard L. Aynes for offering their comments.
1. TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (1867).
2. Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 57, 84 n.158, 85 (1993); Samuel Lee, Timothy Farrar, LL.D, 29 THE NEW
ENGLAND HIST. GENEALOGICAL REG. 225, 231 (Henry Fitz-Gilbert Waters ed., 1875) (noting
that government officials of the day called on Judge Farrar for aid in activities such as drafting
legislation and responding to publications critical of the government).
3. Lee, supra note 2, at 231 (quoting Charles Sumner).
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was what he was “best known” for as a jurist. 4 Another stated it was
“now an accepted text book.” 5 Meanwhile, an obituary published in
the Boston Daily Advertiser described it as being “regarded by jurists
and lawyers as the most exhaustive work on the principles and intent
of the Constitution.”6
In fact, Farrar’s constitutional treatise was so well read that Ohio
Representative William Lawrence cited it “to defend the
constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.” 7 It even received
nation-wide acclaim in the press. For instance, the Philadelphia
Inquirer reported that Farrar’s treatise was “exceedingly useful . . . at
the present time; one that no student of the Constitution, no lawyer
and, above all no legislator should be without.” 8 The Daily Evening
Bulletin described it as “ably written,” “pervaded by a spirit of
candor,” and proclaimed that there “was never a time when there was
more need of an intelligent study of the great charter of our
Republic.” 9 The Cincinnati Daily Gazette thought it “especially
timely,” “a crushing refutation of State right theories,” and a “well
nigh exhaustive treatise on Constitutional Law.” 10
The Manual is of particular significance in our constitutional
jurisprudence because it was one of the first treatises to analyze the
Fourteenth Amendment contemporaneous with its adoption. It was a
work made to be “accessible and useful to the multitudes.”11 As the
American Presbyterian Review reported, Farrar was “[w]idely known
as a sound lawyer” and his treatise was intended for “popular use, and
not almost addressed exclusively to the members of [the legal
profession].” 12 While legal scholars and historians have generally

4. N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 30, 1874, at 7, col. 6. The New York Herald had published a
much shorter obituary the day prior. See N.Y. HERALD, Oct. 29, 1874, at 7, col. 4.
5. THE FARMER’S CABINET (Amherst, N.H.), Nov. 11, 1874, at 2, col. 5.
6. BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 29, 1874, at 1, col. 10.
7. Aynes, supra note 2, at 85 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1244 (1871)
and CONG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (1874)). For other notable mentions to Farrar’s
treatise in support of constitutional arguments, see THE CINCINNATI GAZETTE, Feb. 13, 1871, at
1, col. 2 (arguing that Congress has power to create railroads).
8. THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 9, 1867, at 2, col. 2.
9. DAILY EVENING BULL, (San Francisco, Cal.), Oct. 19, 1867, at 1, col. 3.
10. THE CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 1867, at 1, col. 3; see also N.H.
SENTINEL (Keene, N.H.), Apr. 3, 1873, at 1, col. 2 (describing Farrar’s treatise as a “valuable
work”). For the most detailed review, see 26 NEW ENGLANDER 725–40 (New Haven, Conn.),
Oct. 1867. Of course, not all reviews of Farrar’s treatise were positive. See 9 AM. LITERARY
GAZETTE AND PUBLISHERS’ CIRCULAR 268 (Phila., Pa.), September 16, 1867 (describing
Farrar’s treatise as “the anti-state-right doctrine”); 87 CHRISTIAN EXAMINER 99–104 (N.Y.,
N.Y.), July 1869 (recommending John Pomeroy’s AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES over Farrar’s treatise).
11. THE AM. PRESBYTERIAN REV. 459, 467 (Phila., Pa., July 1870).
12. Id.
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focused on Farrar’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 13 his interpretation of the
Amendment’s Apportionment Clause has seemingly gone overlooked.
Also known as Section 2, the clause reads, “Representatives shall be
apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole numbers of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.” 14 Farrar described Section 2 as follows:
“The whole number of persons in each State cannot mean everybody
on the soil at the particular time, nor exclude everybody who may
happen not to be on it at the same time, and of course should be
authoritatively construed by the law-making power.” 15
To paraphrase, Farrar understood that neither the Constitution nor
the Fourteenth Amendment required an apportionment of every
individual in the United States. He knew the constitutional text
“persons in each State” could be quantified by Congress dependent
upon such factors as whether “persons” were “temporary or
permanent, strangers, aliens, Indians, &c.” 16 However, legislation
concerning which classes of persons were to be excluded from
apportionment was never proposed in the late nineteenth century, thus
leaving the issue to “the preference of the executive officers.” 17 While
historians and legal scholars can only speculate as to why the
Reconstruction Congress never proposed legislation defining “persons
in each State,” such speculation does not disparage the fact that Farrar
and the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment thought such legislation
was constitutionally permissible.
Naturally, the absence of contemporaneous legislation by the
Reconstruction Congress leaves many constitutional questions
13. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary
on the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867–1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153, 229–34
(2009); Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, 1321–22 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the
Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 396 (2009); Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton
Helper’s Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of
the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113, 1172 n.345
(1993); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV.
1359, 1470–72 (1998); Michael Anthony Lawrence, Second Amendment Incorporation Through
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, 72 MO. L. REV.
1, 31 (2007).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
15. FARRAR, supra note 1, § 450, at 403. Farrar did not change his interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Apportionment Clause in subsequent editions. See TIMOTHY FARRAR,
MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 403 (2d. ed., 1869);
TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 403
(3d. ed., 1872).
16. FARRAR, supra note 1, § 449, at 402.
17. Id. § 132, at 158.
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unanswered. Who did the drafters intend to qualify as “persons in
each State”? What classes, if any, could be excluded from the federal
apportionment? What were the constitutional and legal grounds for
excluding these classes from the federal apportionment?
With the 2010 census nearly complete, the answers to these
questions are once again as important as they were in 1866. 18 This is
due to the fact that many Americans see the counting of unlawfully
present aliens in the federal apportionment as politically unfair. While
many states and municipalities implement legislation as a means to
deter unlawful immigration, there are many others that pass legislation
to circumvent the federal immigration laws by acting as sanctuaries for
unlawful immigrants. 19 In other words, many states and municipalities
are benefitting from encouraging unlawful immigration.
One of these benefits includes an increase or shift in congressional
representation. Just this past year, Louisiana Senator David Vitter
offered an amendment to fix this perceived political injustice by
excluding unlawfully present aliens from the federal apportionment. In
particular, the amendment mandated that the Census Bureau inquire
about the status of a person’s citizenship. 20 Vitter’s amendment failed,
however, which leaves us to wonder whether such an amendment or
similar legislation would have even been upheld as constitutional.
Perhaps more importantly, it raises issues of federalism and whether
state and municipal governments can take matters into their own hands
by excluding non-citizens from their respective apportionment bases.
The constitutionality of excluding non-citizens from the federal
apportionment base has been a matter of scholarly discourse for some
time. 21 Unfortunately, the debate is often based on contemporary
politics and the mischaracterization of constitutional history, especially

18. Richard Greener & George Kenney, Census Nonsense, L.A, TIMES, May 29, 2010,
at
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-adv-kenney-census20100529,0,6672071.story; Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/2010/05/30/congress-should-reapportion-representatives-only-on-the-basis-ofcitizen-populations/ (May 30, 2010, 1:46 EST).
19. See 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws. 113.
20. The Vitter Amendment, S. A. 2644, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (search “Bills Summary and Status” for “S. A. 2644”).
21. See April Chung, Noncitizen Voting Rights and Alternatives: A Path Toward Greater
Asian Pacific American and Latino Political Participation, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 163 (1996);
Leo F. Estrada, Making the Voting Rights Act Relevant to the New Demographics of America:
A Response to Farrell and Johnson, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2001); Timothy Mark Mitrovich,

available

Political Apportioning Is Not a Zero-Sum Game: The Constitutional Necessity of Apportioning
Districts to Be Equal in Terms of Both Total Population and Citizen Voter-Age Population, 77
WASH. L. REV. 1261 (2002); Scot A. Reader, One Person, One Vote Revisited: Choosing a
Population Basis to Form Political Districts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521 (1994); Charles
Wood, Losing Control of America’s Future-The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal
Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465 (1999).
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Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, it has been
suggested that “whole numbers of persons in each State” is meant to
be construed as the term “inhabitants,” thus “persons” was only
meant to include individuals “who have their principal residence in the
state, and whose residence there has more than some minimum degree
of permanence and stability.” 22
While lawful resident aliens certainly qualify under this standard,
it is argued that unlawfully present aliens do not.23 As Charles Wood
writes, “[T]here is no indication that for [apportionment the
Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters] distinguished between illegal and
legal aliens.” 24 Wood comes to this conclusion because he believes
that aliens, up to the Reconstruction Era, were never in “an unlawful
status that made them subject to deportation from the United States at
any time.” 25 Thus, he believes Congress could remove unlawfully
present aliens from the apportionment base. 26
It is unfair to claim there were not any legal hurdles placed on
aliens that made them “unlawful” or “illegal” and subject to removal
or excludable from the apportionment base up to the Reconstruction
Congress. 27 Returning to the commentary in the Manual, Judge
Timothy Farrar asserted that the phrase “other persons” in Article I
Section 2 only included aliens that were “legally admitted, or
otherwise constituted as such.” 28 It was these “legally admitted” aliens
who were “a part of the ‘people of the State,’ to whom the
[congressional] representation is assigned, and on whose numbers it is
apportioned.” 29 The reasoning for this restriction on apportionment
was that the Constitution’s “persons” did not “mean everybody,
without regard to anything but their humanity and personality.” 30
“Persons” meant that individuals “must bear some relation to the State
in which they are enumerated.” 31 In other words, Farrar was
rightfully claiming that the ancient doctrine of allegiance could control
apportionment “exclusions.”32
22. Wood, supra note 21, at 487.
23. Id. at 490.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 490–91.
26. Id. at 491.
27. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–
1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1846–59 (1993); E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798–1965, at 13–16 (1981); JAMES H. KETTNER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–1870, at 6–7 (1978).
28. FARRAR, supra note 1, § 205 at 214.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 240, at 237.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Furthermore, Wood’s conclusion on the nineteenth century ignores
the rich legal history that aliens could be subjected to different
treatment regarding the privileges and rights of the host nation, 33
especially political privileges such as voting and apportionment. 34
Naturally, such privileges and rights were conditioned on their
allegiance to just government and submission to laws. 35 This study sets
forth to address this history by focusing on the constitutionality of
excluding undocumented aliens from the federal apportionment base.
What is of particular significance is the intent of the Reconstruction
Congress, for it sheds light on who was to be apportioned and why.
More importantly, it gives weight to Charles Wood’s and Timothy
Farrar’s assertions that Congress could pass a law limiting
apportionment to classes of aliens.
While history is significant as to determining the constitutionality
of excluding unlawfully present aliens from federal apportionment, the
federal government cannot be compelled to exclude undocumented
aliens from the apportionment base. Legislation concerning the
apportionment of unlawfully present aliens has been a non-justiciable
political question that the courts cannot remedy. Thus, the following
study first addresses this subject, as well as the political means by
which the people—through their respective state and municipal
governments—can lobby Congress to act. This requires an examination
and understanding of apportionment at the state and municipal level.
Apportionment legislation at this level is significant because it can
equally distribute the power to vote among citizens. Furthermore, it
seems to be the best vehicle by which the people can urge Congress to
act on the federal apportionment issue.
Second, this study provides a detailed history of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Apportionment Clause, and concludes that Congress has
the authority to exclude unlawfully present aliens from the
apportionment base absent a constitutional amendment. This authority
rests with the ancient and longstanding doctrine of allegiance, which
the Reconstruction Congress repeatedly discussed as being important
to the granting of many of the Constitution’s enumerated rights.36
33. Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of
Ideological Exclusions: A Historical Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL., at 10 (forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1618976. See also 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 1109-25 (1790) (debates of the first Naturalization act discussing the powers
of the federal and State governments to prescribe different privileges for aliens and citizens).
34. Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 977 (2002);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (“[I]t is clear that a State may deny aliens the right
to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at the heart of our political institutions.”).
35. Charles, supra note 33, at 17-23.
36. Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1834–37 (2009);
Douglas G. Smith, A Lockean Analysis of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 HARV.
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II. USING “ONE-PERSON, ONE-VOTE” TO BRING CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT TO THE FOREFRONT OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
As we have seen with the passing of the recent Arizona
immigration law, the politics of unlawfully present aliens is a topic of
heated debate at both the federal and state levels. 37 Known as SB
1070, the Arizona law aids the federal government in the enforcement
of immigration law. While the enforcement of immigration law at the
state level is quite common,38 opponents of these laws consistently
claim violations of equal protection, or privacy, or that such
Naturally,
the
legislation
is
constitutionally
preempted.39
constitutionality of the Arizona law is part of this debate. However,
whether one supports the arguments for or against its constitutionality,
SB 1070 has brought immigration reform to the political forefront.
Perhaps part of this reform will include fixing congressional
apportionment, which currently takes into account unlawfully present
aliens. If not, the people through their respective state and municipal
governments can push for reform by pushing for the exclusion of noncitizens from apportionment at the local level.
For those unfamiliar with apportionment law in the constraints of
the Constitution, the exclusion of non-citizens from state and
municipal government apportionment is known as the “one-person,
one-vote” principle. It gives states and municipalities discretion to
apportion according to a multitude of citizen population formulas. The
“one-person, one-vote” principle has been upheld by the Supreme
Court multiple times. For instance, in Wesberry v. Sanders the Court
held it is well-established that it is within the power of each state to
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1095, 1127–28 (2002); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of
the Rights of Citizenship, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1015, 1029–30 (2008). See generally Christopher
R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 34–43 (2009) (discussing the allegiance for protection doctrine);
William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221
(2008).
37. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.B. 2152, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2010).
38. See United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999) (state trooper
was not preempted from arresting individual solely on the fact that he was an illegal alien);
United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301, 1301 n.3 (10th Cir. 1984) (state
officers may “make a warrantless arrest [upon probable cause of a] violation of the immigration
laws” and have “general investigatory authority to inquire into possible immigration violations”);
Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (state and local officers were not
preempted from enforcing federal immigration laws), overruled on other grounds by, HodgersDurgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999).
39. See ACLU of Arizona Section by Section Analysis of SB 1070 “Immigration; Law
Enforcement; Safe Neighborhoods” as Amended by HB 2162, (May 3, 2010) (on file with
author).
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ensure “one [person’s] vote in a congressional election is to be worth
as much as another’s.” 40 The Wesberry Court went on to clarify that
it “would defeat the principle . . . [of] equal representation . . . to
give some voters a greater voice in choosing Congressman than
others.” 41
Numerous federal courts have also upheld state and municipal
governments’ discretional authority to ensure their respective citizens’
voting power is not diluted by non-citizen numbers. For instance, in
Barnett v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
“[t]he right to vote is one of the badges of citizenship. The dignity and
very concept of citizenship are diluted if noncitizens are allowed to
vote either directly or by the conferral of additional voting power on
citizens believed to have a community of interest with the
noncitizens.” 42 Similarly, in Meza v. Galvin, the Federal District
Court of Massachusetts denied a challenge to a municipal
apportionment plan based on citizenship and not total population. 43
The court held “[b]ecause non-citizens by definition cannot vote, it
makes little sense to consider them for purposes of determining
whether the particular remedial scheme proffered by plaintiffs would
adequately remedy the alleged vote dilution.”44
Naturally—absent a legislative or constitutional device requiring
apportionment based on citizenship—state and municipal governments
cannot be compelled to apportion their districts according to the “oneperson, one-vote” standard. It is purely a political question. In Burns
v. Richardson, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on this
legal point, holding that while states and municipal governments may
exclude non-citizens in determining their respective district
apportionment, the “decision to include or exclude any such group
involves choices about the nature of representation with which we
have been shown no constitutionally founded reason to interfere.”45
To be precise, only through the elective franchise, the right to
petition, and the legislative process can state legislatures and municipal
governments be made to apportion according to citizenship. However,
such encouragement starts with the citizens themselves, for only in
response to their voice and opinion will state and municipal
governments take action. In exercising this voice, it should be
emphasized that not only does apportionment according to citizen
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14.
141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998).
322 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D. Mass. 2004).
Id. at 60.
384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966).
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interests ensure that every citizen’s voting power is equal, but it serves
as a vehicle for petitioning Congress to remedy the Census Bureau’s
counting of unlawful aliens for apportionment purposes.
Despite state and municipal governments having great latitude in
apportioning their respective voting districts, there is one federal
statutory limitation that must be complied with—42 U.S.C. § 1973.
Otherwise known as the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
provides guidelines to ensure state and municipal governments do not
minimize minority voting power.46 The Voting Rights Act, however,
only limits state and municipal governments from affecting the rights
representation of minority voting citizens. Non-citizens do not have to
be taken into account in forming voting districts.
This begets the question, “What data may state and municipal
governments use in determining their respective voting districts?” The
answer to this question is a bit complex. What is certain, though, is
that state and municipal governments do not have to take into account
the total population numbers accrued by the Census Bureau. In Burns
v. Richardson, the Supreme Court elaborated on this point, stating that
“the Equal Protection Clause does not require the States to use total
population figures derived from the federal census as the standard by
which . . . substantial population equivalency is to be measured.”47 In
other words, while state and municipal governments have traditionally
taken total population 48 into account in conducting their respective
apportionments, the federal courts have not precluded state and
municipal governments from using statistics 49 such as voting-age
population (VAP), citizens of voting-age population (CVAP), 50 or
registered voting-age population (RVAP). 51
46. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997
(1994); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66–67
(1980).
47. Burns, 384 U.S. at 91.
48. For an argument in favor of population-based apportionment which includes noncitizens, see Chung, supra note 21, at 182.
49. See Estrada, supra note 21, at 1294 (noting that Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-171, 89 Stat. 1023 (codified as amended at 13 U.S.C. § 141 (1994)) requires the Census
Bureau to provide data such as “population by race and ethnicity, and population 18+ and
population 18+ by race and ethnicity”).
50. CVAP is calculated by dividing the number of eligible citizens into the number of
Spanish surnamed voters. Spanish surnamed voters are determined by matching a list of the most
common Spanish surnames against the voter registration list. Unlike statistics on citizenship,
Spanish surname voter registration can be updated during the decade. Id. at 1294 n. 51. CVAP
is considered to be “the most accurate estimate of potential voters while having the fewest
possible concerns.” Mitrovich, supra note 21, at 1278.
51. In Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773–74 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991), the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that neither the Supreme Court
nor the restraints of the Equal Protection Clause require States to use total population. However,
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While the Supreme Court has not weighed in on which statistics
are constitutionally permissive, Justice Clarence Thomas has opined
that state and municipal governments may use CVAP so long as the
“maximum deviation is allegedly anywhere between 20% to
32.5%.” 52 In other words, Thomas agreed with the lower courts that
the choice to use total population, voting-age population, or citizens of
voting-age population is a choice left to the political process.53
To further ensure compliance with the Voting Rights Act and the
“one-person, one vote” principle, the bright line rule is that state and
municipal governments should not apportion their districts with a
the Garza court held that “California state law requires districting to be accomplished on the
basis of total population.” Id. at 774 (citing Cal. Elec. Code § 35000 (repealed 1994)). In
addition to this, the Garza court weighed the fact that “[r]esidents of the more populous districts
[would] have less access to their elected representative[s].” Id. Thus, the Garza court weighed
Fourteenth Amendment considerations in determining a county’s districting plans. The court
reasoned that “basing districts on voting population rather than total population . . . . would
dilute the access of voting age citizens in that district to their representative, and would similarly
abridge the right of aliens and minors to petition that representative.” Id. at 775. Such a holding
blurs the lines between political and civil rights, and an article by Scot A. Reader has shown the
court’s conclusion—that people have a right to equal access to their elected representative—to be
unsupported. Reader, supra note 21, at 530–42.
The Fourth Circuit examined the Garza court’s holding in great detail. See Daly v. Hunt,
93 F.3d 1212, 1222–28 (4th Cir. 1996). Particular attention was paid to Justice Kozinski’s
dissent, id. (citing Garza, 918 F.2d at 778–88 (Kozinski, J., dissenting), wherein he asserted that
“the proportion of eligible voters serves the principle of electoral equality.” Garza, 918 F.2d at
781 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding “that representational
equality is at least as important as electoral equality in a representative democracy.” Daly, 93
F.3d at 1227. The Fourth Circuit did not affirmatively state that State and municipal
governments cannot take into consideration VAP. Id. at 1228. It merely held that it did not see
VAP as being a superior benchmark in determining apportionment or districting. Id. The Fourth
Circuit made it clear that issues of “electoral equality and representational equality . . . should
be made by the state, not the federal courts, in the inherently political and legislative process of
apportionment.” Id. at 1227 (citing Burns, 384 U.S. at 92).
The Fifth Circuit also disagreed with the Garza majority and dissent. Chen v. City of
Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 528 (5th Cir. 2000). The court stated:
While hardly determinative, our review of the history of the [Fourteenth] amendment
cautions against judicial intrusion in this sphere-either for or against either particular
theory of political equality. . . . We reject the conclusions of both the dissent in Garza
and any reading of the majority opinion in that case that would mandate the use of
total population figures on equal protection grounds.
Id. The Fifth Circuit also stated, “While it does appear that the numerical weight of references is
on the side of electoral equality, it is difficult to attach controlling significance to this fact.” Id.
at 525. The court did not rule out CVAP as a measuring device for apportionment. Id. at 523–
25. See also Chen v. City of Houston, 532 U.S. 1046, 1048 (2001) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). For a summary of this issue see In re Petition of Maria Frica Tudela Pangelinan,
2008 MP 12, 36–43.
52. Chen, 532 U.S. at 1048 (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
53. Id. Regarding RVAP, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina has upheld its constitutionality. In Cannon v. Durham County Bd. of Elections,
959 F. Supp. 289, 298 (E.D. N.C. 1997) (citing Daly, 93 F.3d at 1224), the court stated “unless
the selected population base somehow yields unacceptable results, the court will not second-guess
the measures employed to assist in redistricting,” which included the use of registered voter
population for apportionment purposes.
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population deviation over ten percent.54 Any plan with disparities over
ten percent automatically creates a prima facie case of discrimination
that must be justified by the state. 55 Naturally, complying with the ten
percent rule does not ensure that a redistricting plan is completely
insulated from attack. Instead, complying with the ten percent rule
serves as a de minimis threshold for allocating the burden of proof in
a “one-person, one vote” case. 56 Other than this restriction, all that is
required is that a state or municipality make a “good-faith effort to
achieve precise mathematical equality.”57
III. PLACING THE CENSUS CLAUSE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S
APPORTIONMENT CLAUSE
Just as state and municipal governments cannot be compelled to
institute the “one-person, one-vote” principle, neither Congress nor
the Census Bureau can be compelled to exclude unlawfully present
aliens from the census and the federal apportionment base. In the
1980s, multiple lawsuits were brought forward in an attempt to do
so. 58 However, the courts in these cases found that the plaintiffs did
not have Article III standing to bring their claims. For example, in
Ridge v. Verity the court could not find an injury because it viewed
the evidence of illegal immigration as inconclusive in showing “where
the alleged injury will fall [because the plaintiffs] are unable to
54. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S.
407, 418 (1977). In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973), the Court held that
“minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to
make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as
to require justification by the State[s].” Similarly, in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764
(1973), the Court stated, “we do not consider relatively minor population deviations among state
legislative districts to substantially dilute the weight of individual votes in the larger districts so
as to deprive individuals in these districts of fair and effective representation.”
55. Daly, 93 F.3d at 1218 (“[T]here is a level of population disparity beyond which a
state can offer no possible justification.”). The Supreme Court has not defined what this “upper
level is, but has stated in dictum that a maximum deviation of 16.4% ‘may well approach
tolerable limits.’” Id. (quoting Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973)).
56. Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220; Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 751 (“State legislative districts may be
equal or substantially equal in population and still be vulnerable under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
57. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969). The Kirkpatrick Court
understood that, “The extent to which equality may practicably be achieved may differ from
State to State and from district to district.” Id. at 530. In Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445
(1967) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964)), the Court stated, “[T]he fact that
a 10% or 15% variation from the norm is approved in one State has little bearing on the validity
of a similar variation in another State. ‘What is marginally permissible in one State may be
unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circumstances of the case.’”
58. E.g., Ridge v. Verity, 715 F. Supp. 1308 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Fed’n for Am.
Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1980).
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establish how many illegal aliens will be present in the United States”
in a forthcoming census or “to what extent the illegal population will
come forward to be counted in the 1990 census.” 59 Similarly, in FAIR
v. Klutznick the court determined the plaintiffs could “do no more
than speculate as to which States might gain and which might lose
representation.” 60
For argument’s sake, even if the plaintiffs in either Ridge or FAIR
had met the standing requirements, the history of the failed
Apportionment Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment itself
show the cases would have ultimately failed. What is abundantly clear
from this history is the Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional
purpose. It was expressly drafted to ensure that the former slave states
would not receive an increase in apportionment if they continued to
treat the Freemen as second-class citizens.61 As it was stated in
Congress:
[The Apportionment Clause] is to deprive the lately rebellious States
of the unfair advantage of a large representation in this House, based
on their colored population, so long as that population shall be
denied political rights by the legislation of those States. The
proposed constitutional amendment would simply say to those States,
while you refuse to enfranchise your black population you shall have
no representation based on their numbers; but admit them to civil
and political rights and they shall at once be counted to your
62
advantage in the apportionment of Representatives.

What would essentially become the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Apportionment Clause underwent numerous amendments and
changes. 63 It began on December 5, 1865, the day after Congress
ordered a Joint Committee on Reconstruction to address representation
of the Confederate states in Congress, 64 when Thaddeus Stevens
submitted an amendment to the Constitution that would base
congressional apportionment according to each state’s “respective legal
voters.” 65 The Stevens Amendment limited legal voters to those who
59. Ridge, 715 F. Supp. at 1316.
60. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. at 570.
61. For a popular understanding, see N.Y. HERALD TRIBUTE, Jan. 23, 1866, at 4, col. 2;
DAILY ST. REG. (Des Moines, IA), June 26, 1867, at 2, cols. 1–2.
62. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1866).
63. See BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN
ON RECONSTRUCTION 37–53, 79–103 (Negro Univs. Press 1969) (1914).
64. Id. at 37.
65. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865) (“Representatives shall be apportioned
among the States which may be within the Union according to their respective legal voters: and
for this purpose none shall be named legal voters who are not either natural-born citizens or

35]

REPRESENTATION WITHOUT DOCUMENTATION

47

are either “natural-born citizens or naturalized foreigners.”66 The
purpose behind it was simple. The Republicans hoped to limit
Southern representation in Congress to those whom were given the
privilege to vote.
Under the Constitution’s Census Clause, congressional
apportionment was determined “according to [the states’] respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number
of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons.” 67 However, with the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment, slavery no longer existed, thus making the Three-Fifths
Compromise moot. The freed slaves, known as Freedmen, would now
be counted as whole persons and would give the Southern states a
larger congressional base without requiring them to respect the
Freedman’s civil or political rights. 68
Naturally, the Republicans hoped to prevent this by limiting
apportionment to “legal voters.” This would ultimately encourage the
Southern states to give Freedmen the right to vote while limiting the
intrusion upon states’ rights to grant that privilege. Although the
Stevens Amendment technically achieved this goal, it ultimately failed
because there was general concern it overrode the “true basis of
representation”—total population.69 James G. Blaine expressed this
point, stating, “[W]omen, children, and other non-voting classes may
have as vital an interest in the legislation of the country as those who
actually deposit the ballot.” 70 This would not be his only concern.
Blaine also worried that such an amendment would cause an influx
of voters to gain a larger congressional apportionment. Blaine stated:
There would be an unseemly scramble in all the States . . . to
increase by every means the number of voters, and all conservative
restrictions, such as the requirement of reading and writing now
enforced . . . would be stricken down in a rash and reckless effort to
71
procure an enlarged representation in the national councils.

He saw scenarios where “[f]oreigners would be invited to vote on
a mere preliminary ‘declaration of intention [to settle],’ and the ballot,

naturalized foreigners.”).
66. Id.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
68. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1866).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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which cannot be too sacredly guarded . . . would be demoralized and
disgraced everywhere.” 72 To be precise, Blaine was adamantly against
Stevens’ amendment. Blaine thought a better amendment could be put
in place, one that will “prevent the one evil” of overrepresentation by
the South “without involving others of greater magnitude.”73
To fix this “evil” Blaine proposed the following:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union according to
their respective numbers which shall be determined by taking the
whole number of persons except those to whom civil or political
rights or privileges are denied or abridged by the constitution or
74
laws of any State on account of race or color.

Blaine thought this substitute reached “the result aimed at without
embarrassment to any other question or interest.” 75 Most importantly,
it left “population as heretofore the basis of representation, does not
disturb . . . the harmonious relations of the loyal States, and . . .
conclusively deprives the southern States of all representation in
Congress on account of the colored population so long as those States”
choose to deprive Freemen of political and civil rights.76 In the end,
however, neither of the proposals was accepted and the issue was
turned over to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 77

A. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the Apportionment
Amendment
Similar to the 1865 apportionment proposal, the journal of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction gives insight into the intent of
what would become Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
especially what the phrase whole numbers of persons was meant to
encompass. On January 9, 1866, Thaddeus Stevens made his first joint
resolution. It read almost verbatim to his December 5, 1865 proposal,
stating, “Representatives shall be apportioned . . . according to the
number of respective legal voters; and for this purpose none shall be
considered as legal voters who are not either natural born or
naturalized citizens of the United States, of the age of twenty-one
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 142.
Id.

The proposals were initially sent to the Committee on the Judiciary on December 5,
1865. Id. at 9; see also H.R. Doc. No. 39-4 (1865).
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years.” 78 The difference between this resolution and its 1865
predecessor was that the current resolution required “legal voters” to
be twenty-one years of age. 79
The motion was agreed to, but George Williams, Justin Morrill,
Roscoe Conkling, and George Boutwell all proposed alternatives just
two days later, indicating a change of heart. Morrill was for
apportionment “according to their respective numbers of persons,
deducting therefrom all of any race or color, whose members . . . are
denied any of the civil or political rights.”80 What makes Morrill’s
proposal unique is that it would have only deducted from
apportionment those races that were discriminated against. Certainly,
the unfettered discretion of states to discriminate against some races
and not others must have led to the proposal’s demise.
George Williams proposed a more specific resolution that similarly
apportioned “according to . . . respective numbers,” but expressly
excluded “negroes, Indians, Chinese, and all persons, not white, who
are not allowed the elective franchise by the Constitutions of the States
in which they respectively reside.” 81 Meanwhile, Roscoe Conkling 82
and George Boutwell 83 both proposed alterations that would apportion
according to the number of citizens. None of these resolutions were
ever voted on. However, when Reverdy Johnson resubmitted a
proposal that apportionment should be according to the “respective
numbers of legal voters” the resolution was voted on and denied. 84
Given the Committee could not come to an agreement as to the
basis for congressional apportionment, a two man sub-committee
consisting of Thaddeus Stevens and William Fessenden was appointed
“to which shall be referred the various propositions submitted by
members of this [Joint] Committee.”85 On January 12, the subcommittee came to terms on two alternative propositions. Known as
“Article A,” the first read:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States within this Union, according to the respective numbers
of citizens of the United States in each State; and all provisions in

78. KENDRICK, supra note 63, at 41.
79. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865).
80. KENDRICK, supra note 63, at 43.
81. Id. at 43–44.
82. Id. at 44 (“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned . . . according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of citizens of the United States.”).
83. Id. (“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned . . . according to their
respective number of citizens of the United States in each State.”).
84. Id. at 45 (“yeas 6, nays 8, absent and not voting 1”).
85. Id. at 46.

50

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 25

the Constitution or laws of any State, whereby any distinction is
made in political or civil rights or privileges, on account of race,
86
creed or color, shall be inoperative and void.

Known as “Article B,” the second proposition read:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to
the respective numbers, counting the whole number of citizens of the
United States in each State; provided that, whenever the elective
franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race,
creed or color, all persons of such race, creed or color, shall be
87
excluded from the basis of representation.

Out of these two propositions, Article B moved forward. 88
However, Article B’s language would be short lived because Conkling
immediately proposed to remove the phrase “citizens of the United
States in each State” and substitute it with “persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.” 89 The amendment passed with ease, 90
and the resolution was sent to Congress. 91

B. Congressional Debate of the Apportionment Amendment
On January 22, 1866, Thaddeus Stevens presented to Congress the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction’s first draft of what would become
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 He opened by stating that it
“proposes to change the present basis of representation to a
representation upon all persons, with the provis[ion] that wherever any
State excludes a particular class of persons from the elective
franchise,” that class of persons shall not be counted for
86. Id. at 50.
87. Id. at 50–51.
88. Id. at 51 (“yeas 11, nays 3, absent and not voting 1”).
89. Id. at 52.
90. Id. (“yeas 11, nays 3, absent and not voting 1”).
91. This final resolution passed with “yeas 13, nay 1, absent and not voting 1.” Id. at 53.
Jacob Howard and Henry Grider reserved their “right to support . . . some proposition more in
accordance with their views, should they deem it advisable to do so.”
92. The amendment as it was sent to the House read:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union, according to the respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed; provided that
whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of
race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation.

Id.
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apportionment purposes. 93 Stevens made it clear that the amendment
was not intended to invade upon each respective state’s right to
regulate the elective franchise. It simply conditioned apportionment
upon the admittance of voting classes. He provided the following
example, “‘If you exclude from the right of suffrage Frenchmen,
Irishmen, or any particular class of people, none of that class of
persons shall be counted in fixing your representation in this
House.’” 94
At this time, some interpreted Stevens’ characterization as
implying that if a state excluded settled foreigners from the right to
vote, that such settled foreigners would not be included for
apportionment purposes. 95 However, to characterize Stevens’
statement in this light is to take him out of context. As the New York
Herald Tribune reported, the apportionment clause could be summed
up as follows:
[Section 2 requires] only that each [State] shall abide by its own
decision, and not count as the basis of political power in the Union
such portion of its population as it shall deprive of power and
exclude from the body politic. In other words, it says: “Account
your Blacks men or brutes; but, if you account them brutes, do not
96
ask either States to regard them as men.”

Additionally, when one takes the Fourteenth Amendment debates
in their entirety, and in context, it is clear that the rights of states to
exclude settled foreigners from voting without excluding them for
apportionment purposes was well established.97 This constitutional
precedent was reiterated over and over as members of the House
submitted amendments that would limit apportionment to either “legal
voters” or “qualified electors.”98 Andrew Rogers elaborated on this
point, stating:
When the Constitution of the United States was made, our [founding]
fathers . . . embodied in it the doctrine that representation should not
be based upon the voting population of the country, but that it should
be solely and wholly based upon the numbers of the people, without

93. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 351 (1866).
94. Id.
95. The Jamestown Journal reported something to this effect. See JAMESTOWN J.
(Jamestown, N.Y.), Feb. 9, 1866, at 2, col. 1.
96. N.Y. HERALD TRIBUTE, Jan. 23, 1866, at 4, col. 2.
97. DAILY ST. GAZETTE (Trenton, NJ), Jan., 30, 1866, at 2, col. 1 (“In most States aliens
are not permitted to vote.”).
98. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 352 (1866).
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regard to sex or color, adding to those who were persons and
99
citizens . . . .

Any question about whether settled foreigners are included as
“numbers of people” is removed upon the following discourse that
took place. It began when Rogers made the following statement:
Every man in this House knows perfectly well in the several States a
person under the age of twenty-one years cannot vote, unnaturalized
citizens cannot vote, and the whole class of females, constituting
nearly one half of the population of this country, cannot vote; yet for
100
these persons the States are entitled to representation.

Mr. Kelley replied that he did not see why the Freedmen should
be included in the apportionment. 101 He differentiated Freedmen from
“male minor[s]” and the “unnaturalized foreigner,” arguing that
Freedmen “can never vote [and] should not be counted among voters
and possible voters in fixing the basis of suffrage.” 102 Meanwhile, the
“unnaturalized foreigner[s]” and “male minor[s]” were different in
that they would eventually acquire the right to vote.103 Rogers quickly
corrected Kelley’s understanding of the Constitution by reminding him
that the States may also “allow to the negroes the same political
status” that “may be allowed to the man under twenty-one and the
unnaturalized foreigner.” 104
To be precise, this political exchange shows that the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment adhered to the constitutional principle that
settled foreigners were part of the apportionment base. Roscoe
Conkling summed up this constitutional principle nicely, stating, “The
political disability of aliens was not for [representation purposes to be]
counted at all against them, because it was certain to be temporary,
and they were admitted at once into the basis of apportionment.” 105
99. Id. at 353. Rogers also queried:
What is there more democratic and republican in the institutions of this country than
that the people of all classes, without regard to whether they are voters or not, white
or black, who make up the intelligence, wealth, and patriotism of the country, shall be
represented in the council of the nation?
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 354.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 356. Although Conkling’s interpretation of the Census Clause was correct, his
interpretation was influenced by his desire to ensure that the 390,456 “unnaturalized foreigners”
settled in New York were counted for apportionment purposes. ALBANY EVENING J. (Albany,
N.Y.), Feb. 7, 1866, at 1, col. 7. Conkling estimated “unnaturalized foreigners” contributed to
“three Representatives and a fraction of a fourth.” Id. Meanwhile, Conkling supported excluding
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Conkling also commented on the issue, stressing that foreigners were
to be included in the apportionment base because “the number of
aliens in some States is very large, and growing larger now.” 106
Conkling reminded his fellow delegates that the proposed amendment
substituted “persons” in favor of “citizens of the United States”—
”[p]ersons, and not citizens, have always constituted the basis” of
apportionment. 107
The popular print culture of the era renders a similar
interpretation. The different amendments proposing to substitute voting
population in lieu of “persons” received differing opinions. The
Albany Evening Journal supported the change to “voters” because it
“holds out the very strongest inducement for the several States to
liberalize the suffrage.” 108 Although this “application . . . [would]
work unequally upon some of the Northern States, where there is
always a large alien population in the process of becoming voters,”
the Albany Evening Journal thought “this slight injustice will be
overbalanced an hundred fold by the greater good which will result
from it when practically applied in all the States.” 109
Other newspapers, however, did not support such a change. For
instance, the Daily State Gazette thought a change to voter
apportionment required a more “mature deliberation” by Congress.110
It foresaw a drastic change in America’s voting system should voter
apportionment be adopted, for it would “offer a constant and powerful
inducement to an increase of the number of voters.” 111 This increase
of voters would have to include aliens who were generally “not
permitted to vote” in order for states to maintain their
representation. 112 The Daily State Gazette thought such a constitutional
change was too drastic, would “interpose[s] peculiar difficulties”
among the states, and was a “waste [of] paper” since it would not
acquire the constitutionally required “three-fourths of the States.” 113
The Macon Weekly Telegraph and the Macon Daily Telegraph
expressed similar dissatisfaction with voter apportionment. 114 They
Freedmen from voting in New York because they comprised only 49,005 persons, thus their
“number is too small to take away a single Representative, and too small to add one should all
the blacks be counted.” Id.
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 359 (1866).
107. Id.
108. ALBANY EVENING J. (Albany, N.Y.), Mar. 12, 1866, at 2, col. 2.
109. Id.
110. DAILY ST. GAZETTE (Trenton, N.J.), Jan. 30, 1866, at 1, col. 1.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See MACON DAILY TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Feb. 9, 1866, at 2, col. 1; MACON
WKLY. TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Feb. 12, 1866, at 4, col. 2.
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described a constitutional change to “legal voters” as “political
heresy” and a “crying injustice.” 115 The Macon newspapers felt that
“[r]eason, justice, philosophy, and the entire spirit of government”
required apportionment according to the “great body of people who
come under the jurisdiction of government.” 116 They elaborated on
this point, writing:
In all free governments, representation is an inherent right in all the
governed. It proceeds upon the principle, always held as vital in
republics, that those who are controlled by the laws and pay their
money for the support of government, whatever be their age, sex, or
condition, have a right to be heard in that government through duly
117
appointed agents.

It must be emphasized that the main purpose of the Apportionment
Amendment was to encourage states to grant Freedmen access to the
ballot by conditioning congressional apportionment on said access.
However, aliens and unnaturalized foreigners were also central to the
debate for four important reasons. First, aliens and unnaturalized
foreigners that are “controlled by the laws” 118 fall into the category of
what the Republic was intended to constitute. Second, any amendment
that limited apportionment to “legal voters” would essentially remove
not only women and children from apportionment, but aliens and
unnaturalized foreigners too. Third, the majority of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress thought it was outside the bounds of logic to allow aliens
and foreigners to be counted for apportionment purposes while
excluding Freedmen. Lastly, it was feared that limiting apportionment
to “legal” or “qualified” voters would encourage states to widen its
voting base to include unnaturalized foreigners and aliens—classes that
were generally excluded from voting to prevent foreign influence on
America’s political structure. Addressing this point, Conkling stated:
If voters alone should be made the foundation of representation, the
actual ratio would vary infinitely among different States. One State
might let women and minors vote. Another might—some of them
do—give the ballot to those otherwise qualified who have been
residents for ten days. Another might extend suffrage to aliens. This
119
would lead to a strife of unbridled suffrage.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

MACON DAILY TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Feb. 9, 1866, at 2, col. 1.

Id.
Id.
Id.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1866).
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Conkling went on to emphasize the fear that “legal voter”
apportionment would extend suffrage to aliens, stating, “[I]f an
amendment to the Constitution basing representation upon ‘qualified
voters’ merely should be adopted, a State might enlarge its
apportionment by allowing aliens to vote . . . . California may let her
Chinese and half-breeds vote, Oregon her Indians, and any State its
aliens.” 120 For historical context, it should be emphasized that what
would become Section 2 did not propose to strip the States of the
power to grant political privileges; each state still had “sole control,
free from all interference, of its own interests and concerns.” 121
Section 2 merely provided a penalty to those states that chose to
discriminate against citizens according to race or class.122
In the end, however, this first attempt to fix the apportionment
dilemma was unsuccessful, for the Apportionment Amendment was
rejected by President Andrew Johnson. As a result, the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction would reconvene to draft a new
proposal—the Fourteenth Amendment.

C. The Joint Committee, Apportionment, and Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
On April 21, 1866, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
reconvened to propose another joint resolution to the Constitution “to
provide for the restoration to the states lately in insurrection of their
full political rights.” 123 Initially, the new joint resolution read
drastically different than the Amendment that was vetoed by President
Johnson. Regarding apportionment, the new joint resolution read:
Until the fourth day of
no class of persons,
discrimination shall be
previous condition of
124
representation.

July, one thousand eight hundred seventy-six,
as to the right of any whom to suffrage
made by any state, because of race, color, or
servitude, shall be included in the basis of

120. Id.
121. Id. at 359.
122. The amendment left every State perfectly free to decide for itself, not only who shall
vote, but who shall belong to its political community in any way, and thus to say who shall enter
into its basis of representation and who shall be shut out. What the States decide for themselves
in their own affairs they decide for themselves in their national affairs. Id. at 357. For another
account of the history of the Apportionment Amendment, see Mark S. Scarberry, Historical

Considerations and Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: Constitutionality
of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill in Light of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the History of the Creation of the District, 60 ALA. L. REV. 783, 819–29 (2009).
123. KENDRICK, supra note 63, at 83.
124. Id. at 84.
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This new language was short lived. On April 28th the
apportionment provision was entirely substituted by George Williams
to read:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union according to the respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State
excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever in any State the elective
franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens, not less
than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation
in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
125
not less than twenty-one years of age.

The substitution was approved by the overwhelming majority of
the committee. While the first half of the substituted provision reads
almost verbatim to the Committee’s vetoed amendment, the second
half fixed any concerns about including women or minors to the
elective franchise. More importantly, it adequately articulated that
states could continue to prescribe differentiating rules of law
concerning non-citizens, women, and citizens under the age of twentyone years. No further changes were made by the Committee, and
Williams’ substitution was submitted to Congress as Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

D. Congressional Debate Over the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Apportionment Clause
On May 23, 1866, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
presented its second draft of the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator
Jacob Howard stated the Amendment’s “basis of representation is
numbers, whether the numbers be white or black.”126 He was clear to
point out that the Constitution had always required apportionment
“according to their respective numbers of men, women, and
children.” 127 However, as the Constitution currently stood, without
this Amendment, the “recently slaveholding States” could “exclude
from the ballot the whole of their black population” while including
the “whole of that population in the basis of their representation.”128
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 102.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).

Id.
Id.
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Section 2 fixed this disparity. It ensured that numbers remained
the basis of representation as it always had. Howard illuminated on
this point several times, explaining that apportionment could not be
determined according to property,129 education, or upon the numbers
of voters. 130 It was essential that apportionment be based on total
numbers because it “is the safest and most secure principle upon
which the Government can rest. Numbers not voters; numbers not
property; this is the theory of the Constitution.”131
Naturally, not everyone in the Senate agreed with the Joint
Committee’s apportionment provision. Senator Thomas Hendricks did
not see why the Freedmen should be counted as whole persons. He
offered an amendment that would count the “whole numbers of
persons in each State,” but exclude Indians and “two fifths of such
persons as have been discharged from involuntary servitude.” 132
Meanwhile, Senator James R. Doolittle proposed that apportionment
be based on “male electors over twenty-one years.”133 He elaborated:
[T]he voting population of the country should be represented; that a
voter in Wisconsin should have precisely the same voice in the
House of Representatives as a voter in Massachusetts or a voter in
Kentucky or a voter in South Carolina; that if twenty thousand voters
in Wisconsin are permitted to speak one voice or cast one vote in the
House of Representatives, twenty thousand voters in South Carolina
should not be permitted to cast any more than one voice or vote. I
believe that a constitutional amendment based upon this principle,
the principle of the representation of voters, is more likely to be
acceptable to the States than the proposition which is reported by the
134
committee and pending before the Senate.

Senator Doolittle supported his argument with tables and statistics
129. One could argue that the Three-Fifths Compromise partially based apportionment on
property, but the Thirteenth Amendment overturned this provision. Id.
130. Id. at 2767 (“Nor did the committee adopt the principle of making the ratio of
representation depend[ant] upon the number of voters, for it so happens that there is an unequal
distribution of voters in the several States . . . .”).
131. Id. Howard also stated that “numbers shall be the basis of representation in Congress,
the only true, practical and safe republican principle.” Id. Additionally, Howard stated:
the true representation of the [people is] whole population. It is not property, it is not
education, for great abuses would arise from the adoption of the one or the other of
these two tests. Experience has shown that great numbers and numbers only is the
only and true safe basis; while nothing is clearer than that property qualification and
educational qualifications have an inevitable aristocratic tendency—a thing to be
avoided.

Id.

132. Id. at 2940.
133. Id. at 2942.
134. Id.
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showing the impact of apportioning according to either “male
electors” or “the voters as returned by the census.” 135 Senator
Williams expressed concern that Doolittle’s plan would cause New
York to lose apportionment. Similar to what New York Representative
Roscoe Conkling had stated months earlier, Williams knew that
currently apportionment was “based upon population” including the
“four hundred thousand foreigners not naturalized;” thus, he queried
whether or not New York would lose the “three Representatives in the
House” gained from the apportionment of foreigners under Doolittle’s
plan. 136
Doolittle did not address Williams’ concerns. Instead, he reiterated
his belief that the “principle that voters should have an equal voice in
the choice of Representatives in the House . . . is a principle upon
which we can stand and contend.” 137 However, before Doolittle’s
amendment was put to a vote, Senator George F. Edmunds interjected
that whether apportionment should be according to population or
voters “is a question which enters into the profoundest philosophy of
government.” 138 If Edmunds had to choose, though, he would not
“discard the original principle that all society in some form is to be
represented in a republican Government.” 139 To him, apportionment
by population was an “impregnable” principle.140
In the end, the Doolittle Amendment did not pass—“yeas 7, nays
31.” 141 It seems that the overwhelming Senate majority felt that
Doolittle’s proposal disenfranchised the community. Senator Luke
Poland commented on this point, stating, “All the people, or all the
members of a State or community, are equally entitled to protection;
they are all subject to its laws; they must all share its burdens, and
they are all interested in its legislation and government.” 142 Simply
put, Poland believed to base representation solely on voters was
philosophically and politically flawed. He observed that “we all know
that many females are far better qualified to vote intelligently and
wisely than many men who are allowed to vote; and the same is true
of many males under twenty-one, and of foreigners who have not
resided here for a period of five years.”143
Within moments of his amendment being denied, Senator Doolittle
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2943–44.
at 2944.

at 2986.
at 2962.
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proposed a nearly identical amendment that apportioned according to
the number of “male citizens of the United States over twenty-one
years of age qualified by the law of such State” to vote. 144 Senator
William Sherman supported the amendment, stating that “the true
basis of representation . . . is the number of male citizens who under
the laws of the States are allowed to vote.” 145 Sherman also stated that
it was a proposition that “puts a citizen in one State on a footing of
precise equality with a citizen in every other State.”146 Sherman did
not see why a state that has “a preponderance of women,” “a very
large element of unnaturalized foreigners,” or “a large mass of [the]
negro population” should have more political power than other
states. 147 He believed the true proposition was to base apportionment
on male citizen voters so that “[n]o State and no community would
have the right to complain” and “every citizen would stand equal
before the law, with precisely the same political power.”148
Senator James Wilson chimed in, declaring that he would not
support any amendment that would “strike from the basis of
representation two million one hundred thousand unnaturalized
foreigners . . . for whom [Iowa is] now entitled to seventeen
Representatives.”149 Sherman countered by asking, “But ought
[foreigners] . . . be counted until we intrust [sic] them with political
power?” 150 He hoped that foreigners would not be included in
apportionment until they are fit to vote. In the end, Senators Doolittle
and Sherman’s hopes were dashed, for the amendment was handily
defeated—“yeas 7, nays 31.” 151
With the failure of the Doolittle Amendment to restrict
apportionment to male citizen voters, the Senate turned its attention to
Section 2 as the Joint Committee presented it.152 Senator Johnson
144. Id. at 2986.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2986–87.
150. Id. at 2987.
151. Id. at 2991.
152. It read:
Representatives s[h]all be apportioned among the several States [which may be
included within this Union] according to the respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each State excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever the right
to vote at any election held under the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of
any State, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one
years of age and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged except for
participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
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defended Section 2 by assuring his fellow Senators that population is
the “true basis” of apportionment. 153 However, Johnson could not see
the logic in excluding Freedmen from a respective state’s
apportionment should they be denied the right to vote. “[A]liens . . .
women, black and white, . . . minors, those under twenty-one years
of age, white and black . . . [and] those who have participated ‘in
rebellion or other crimes’” are excluded from the right to vote, yet,
they are included in the apportionment stated Johnson.154 A point he
would reiterate multiple times.155
Johnson could not see how Congress could “deny [Freedmen] the
right to be represented . . . simply because they are not permitted to
exercise the right of voting.” 156 This constitutional punishment, which
was intended to affect the States, inadvertently placed the black
population on less of a constitutional footing than aliens, rebels,
minors, females, and “those who may have committed crimes of the
most heinous character.” 157
Senator Henry Henderson justified this disparity with prejudiced
logic. He distinguished “women and aliens” from the freed slaves by
stating the former “are regarded as persons and not dumb brutes; they
enjoy the right to acquire property, to enter the courts for its
protection, . . . they are a part of the people.” He further
differentiated aliens from the freed slaves, stating, “[t]he road to the
ballot is open to the foreigner; it is not permanently barred” as it was
to the Freedmen. 158
Given the era of American history, assuredly Henderson was not
alone in his sentiments, but this should not disparage the underlying
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was to ensure equal
protection to the recently freed slaves. Its entire purpose was to
condition the admission of the Southern states into to the Union. In
terms of Section 2, the Fourteenth Amendment served to encourage
the States to allow Freedmen to participate in the political process with
white men by conditioning apportionment on equal civil and political
rights.

Id.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3027.
at 3027–28.
at 3029.
at 3035.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCLUDING UNLAWFULLY
PRESENT ALIENS FROM THE APPORTIONMENT
As shown above, the history of the Apportionment and Fourteenth
Amendments affirms that the phrase “whole numbers of persons” was
intended to include all persons—citizens and non-citizens alike.
However, this history also demonstrates that the drafters envisioned
different protections for citizens and non-citizens.159 A speech by John
Bingham illustrates this point perfectly, in which he stated that the
Constitution guarantees “political rights to the citizens of the United
States” and “natural rights to all persons, whether citizens or
strangers.” 160 Eventually, this distinction would be placed within the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. While Section 1 ensures that
no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws,” it differentiates aliens from citizens in
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.161
Another significant fact is that at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was generally assumed that foreigners had either
settled in accordance with local laws or were applying for citizenship.
Regarding this latter assumption, it should be noted all that was
required to obtain citizenship was that foreigners announce their
presence, give an oath of allegiance, and reside in the United States
for five years. 162 The rules of naturalization were lenient on settlement
for many reasons, political and economic, but the debates reveal that
the drafters assumed that emigrating foreigners intended to settle and
apply for citizenship in adherence with the rules of naturalization.163
Such lenient rules, however, should not distract from the fact that the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were familiar with the law of
nations concerning settlement and allegiance to laws.164
159. AKHIL REED AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 172–74, 182
(1999).
160. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
162. 2 Stat. 153 (1802).
163. Senator Johnson justified separating foreigners from those Southerners that
participated in the Civil War because “a foreigner reside[s] peaceably among us with the
intention of becoming a citizen.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2400 (1866).
164. Outside of the classic works of Grotius, Vattel, Hale, Blackstone, and others,
numerous international law treatises discussed the important of allegiance, settlement, and the
rights of a nation. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH A SKETCH
OF THE HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE 99–101, 111–12, 122, 177–81, 230, 237–42 (1836) (numerous
later editions were published); DANIEL GARDNER, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND A
SHORT EXPLANATION OF THE JURISDICTION AND DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE UNITED STATES 98, 110, 150, 157, 180, 255 (1844) (numerous later editions were
published); 1 RICHARD WILDMAN, INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL
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In fact, members of both the House and Senate defended their
respective positions regarding the inclusion of “unnaturalized
foreigners” in apportionment on the belief that the “unnaturalized
foreigner” would acquire political privileges in five years, including
the right to vote. In other words, much of the debate centered on the
belief that “unnaturalized foreigners” had submitted themselves to the
laws and taken steps to obtain citizenship. For instance, when
Representative Roscoe Conkling stood up and defended the
constitutionality of aliens in the apportionment, he did so because their
“political disability . . . was certain to be temporary.” 165 It did not
matter that the “unnaturalized foreigner” did not have “full political
rights” because this disability would be fixed upon their
naturalization.166 Meanwhile, Senator Henderson defended inclusion of
aliens in the apportionment because “[t]he road to the ballot is open to
the foreigner; it is not permanently barred.”167 Senator Sherman even
defended the proposition of voter-based apportionment because the
“unnaturalized foreign population” are on “a short period of
probation—five years; and in most of the states the great body of them
are promptly admitted to citizenship.” 168
Thus, the philosophy behind including (or, in some cases,
excluding) settled foreigners in the apportionment base was that they
were viewed as members of the United States, the respective states,
and their local communities. The Macon Daily Telegraph made this
philosophical observation when it argued that “Reason, justice, [and]
philosophy” support aliens should be included in congressional
apportionment because they “come under the jurisdiction of
government.” 169 “[A]ll the governed” are subject to the jurisdiction
because they are “controlled by the laws and pay their money for the
support of government.” 170 Senator Poland made a similar observation
for including foreigners in the apportionment base, stating, “All the
people, or all the members of a State or community, are equally
entitled to protection [because] they are all subject to its laws [and]
they must all share in its burdens, and they are all interested in its
legislation and government.” 171 Emphasis should be placed on the
important legal principle alluded to in these statements—individuals
RIGHTS IN TIME OF PEACE 6, 40–45, 82, 133 (1849) (numerous later editions were published and
also cited by the Supreme Court in the 1873 Carlisle v. United States opinion).
165. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1866).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2987.
168. Id. at 3035.
169. MACON DAILY TELEGRAPH (Macon, GA), February 9, 1866, at 2, col. 1.
170. Id.
171. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., 2962 (1866).
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are included in the apportionment because they are fully “subject to its
laws,” “share in its burdens,” and are “controlled by the laws.”

A. The Doctrine of Allegiance and Congressional Apportionment
The doctrine of allegiance—or plenary power over immigration—
was not created at the time of Reconstruction. 172 It existed long before
the adoption of the Constitution and was well understood by the
Reconstruction Congress. 173 Foreigners during Reconstruction
generally qualified under the doctrine of allegiance because they were
adhering to the rules of naturalization. However, today, a large
portion of foreigners do not subject themselves fully to laws by
entering or remaining in the United States as unlawfully present
aliens. It is arguably outside the bounds of constitutional logic for a
class of foreigners to be entitled to the full protection of the
Constitution, especially the political privilege of apportionment, if they
do not subject themselves fully to the laws. As “[t]he right to vote is
one of the badges of citizenship,” 174 one may equally argue that the
right to be apportioned is a badge of law abiding residence.
A common argument levied against such reasoning is that
unlawfully present aliens share in the burdens of the community,
sometimes contribute taxes, and therefore should be counted for
apportionment purposes. However, when aliens only partially submit
to the laws of their host nation they violate the first rule of the law of
nations concerning emigration—the doctrine of allegiance and
submission to the government. These rules were well understood
during the Founding and in the late nineteenth century. If we use these
basic legal principles in contemporary legal philosophy, we can
conclude that they are constitutional principles by which Congress may
exclude unlawfully present aliens from apportionment. As of today,
the federal immigration laws expressly require all aliens who remain
“in the United States for thirty days or longer, to apply for
registration and to be fingerprinted before the expiration of such thirty
days.” 175 Any alien that fails to register is not only subject to
deportation, but may also be fined up to $1000, be imprisoned for six

172. The doctrine can be traced back to sixteenth century England. See Charles, supra note
33.
173. See generally Charles, supra note 33; Green, supra note 36, at 34–43; Mayton, supra
note 36; William G. Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well
Change the Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221, 1256–57
(2010); Zietlow, supra note 36, at 1030; Wood, supra note 21, at 506–10.
174. Barnett v. City of Chi., 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).
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months, or both. 176
Therefore, there is a strong constitutional argument that failure to
apply for such registration and to announce one’s presence is a
violation of the doctrine of allegiance and a sufficient ground for
Congress to exclude such violators from the apportionment base.
Judge Timothy Farrar would have thought so. Based upon his
commentary in the Manual, he knew the phrase “whole number of
persons in each State” did not have to “mean everybody on the soil at
the particular time.”177 Congress could condition apportionment of
aliens on the legal doctrine of allegiance, requiring that they be
“legally admitted, or otherwise constituted as such.” 178 “Legally
admitted” did not “mean everybody, without regard to anything but
their humanity and personality,” but “persons” that “bear some
relation to the State in which they are enumerated.”179
Recently, the Congressional Research Services (CRS) has asserted
otherwise. Without adequately examining the issue, CRS asserts that
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment proves that all aliens,
unlawful and lawful, have a political right to be counted for
apportionment purposes. 180 Although CRS provides no historical
evidence, support for their argument could principally rest in Senator
Johnson’s opposition to granting the States the option of whether to
include Freedmen in the apportionment, for it “den[ied foreigners] the
right to be represented.” 181 Johnson stated:
Minors, women, black or white, with or without a property
qualification, all within the limits of a State, have a right to have
themselves considered in ascertaining who is to represent that State,
numerically, because in proportion to the number of representatives
do you increase the security of all the citizens who may be within
182
the limits of a State.

There is no denying that Senator Johnson and the Reconstruction
Congress viewed lawful aliens as having a political right to be counted
for apportionment purposes. However, it would be misleading to

176. Id. § 1306(a).
177. FARRAR, supra note 1, § 450 at 403.
178. Id. § 205 at 214.
179. Id. § 240 at 237.
180. See generally MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE & ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41048, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXCLUDING ALIENS FROM THE CENSUS FOR
APPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING PURPOSES (2010) available at http://assets.opencrs.com
/rpts/R41048_20100120.pdf.
181. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3029 (1866).
182. Id. at 767.
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assume the same political right extends to aliens that Congress
categorizes as unlawful through its plenary authority over
immigration, citizenship, naturalization, and foreign affairs. 183 Just as
the Constitution gives lawfully present aliens the political right to be
apportioned for representation in Congress, the Constitution also
grants Congress great latitude in excluding unlawfully present
aliens. 184 Historical and legal support for this exclusion is derived
from the history of the Constitution’s Naturalization Clause and the
long established doctrine of allegiance, which will be discussed
further.
For instance, let us take into account Senator Johnson’s comments.
He conveys the importance of the doctrine of allegiance in construing
the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “when a person is an alien
enemy, either by being the subject of a foreign jurisdiction or by
virtue of his own treason, he remains an alien enemy to this
Government until Congress relieves him from that disability.” 185 This
disability includes the “forfeit[ing] all the [political] rights that he ever
enjoyed under the Constitution,” including “the right to be represented
in Congress . . . the right to hold office . . . [and] every right except
such as he may exercise under the law of nations” or the Constitution
of the United States. 186 Generally, an “alien enemy” is a citizen of a
country that is in a state of conflict with the land in which he or she is
located. However, Johnson undoubtedly includes aliens that are “the
subject of a foreign jurisdiction” as well. 187 A definition that is
reminiscent of Sir Francis Bacon’s Three Speeches, wherein he
declared that even an alien friend “may be . . . an enemy,” thus “the
Law allotteth” only a “benefit” that is “transitory.” 188
While one may argue that Johnson’s legal analysis was
unsupported in the late nineteenth century, a brief examination of
some of the prominent legal treatises of the era verifies Johnson’s
interpretation as the correct one, and confirms that the doctrine of
allegiance was alive and well at the time of the ratification of the

183. For case law supporting the Plenary Power Doctrine, see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 521–22 (2003); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305–06 (1993); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 940 (1983); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
377 (1971); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 588–89 (1952); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950);
Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 556–67 (1913); Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. 73, 92 (1874).
184. See Charles, supra note 33, at 22-39.
185. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2400 (1866).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. FRANCIS BACON, THREE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE, SIR FRANCIS BACON
KNIGHT 11 (1641).
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Fourteenth Amendment. 189 For instance, in Alexander Porter Morse’s
work, A Treatise on Citizenship, the doctrine of allegiance was
addressed in detail from the time of Aristotle to the late nineteenth
century. 190 Morse identified this ancient doctrine as being “in
substantial accord with the legislation and practice of . . . the United
States.” 191 In fact, Morse confirms that “temporary allegiance (which
describes the obedience due by an alien to the laws of the jurisdiction
in which he happens to be commorant) [was] everywhere recognized”
at this time. 192
What is of particular interest in Morse’s work is that he
unknowingly addresses the contemporary legal dilemma of unlawfully
present aliens that the United States faces. Morse wrote:
Certain persons may . . . be under the jurisdiction of two different
states, or even a great number of states. In case of conflict, the
preference will be given to the state in which the individual or
family in question have their [legal] domicile; their rights in the
states where they do not reside will be considered as suspended. If
the oath of allegiance is the first tie which binds the citizen to the
state, it is evident that the individual cannot appeal . . .
193
simultaneously to two sovereignties, to two distinct nationalities.

Morse’s analysis is applicable today because unlawfully present
aliens, although physically present, do not lawfully reside or have a
legal domicile within the United States. They are essentially under the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States while still fully subject to
the foreign jurisdiction they originated from, which they have yet to
formally denounce by submitting to registration in the United States.
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the importance of

189. See, e.g., JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
BEING AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOURCE AND LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY,
ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN THEORY 211–14 (1867) (discussing the doctrine of allegiance in
defining citizenship). See also supra note 164.
190. See generally ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE, A TREATISE ON CITIZENSHIP, BY BIRTH
AND BY NATURALIZATION, WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF NATIONS, ROMAN CIVIL LAW,
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE LAW OF FRANCE (1881). A few articles
have examined Morse’s treatise in light of understanding citizenship and allegiance. See
Bernadette Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898 States’ Rights, the Law
of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 519 (2001); Sarah Helene Duggin &
Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous
Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix It,
85 B.U. L. REV. 53 (2005).
191. MORSE, supra note 190, § 128 at 159.
192. Id. § 129 at 159.
193. Id. § 129 at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting JOHANN KASPAR
BLUNTSCHLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFIED, § 394).
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allegiance in the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment stems from
Henry Brannon’s A Treatise on the Rights and Privileges Guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 194 Discussing Section 1’s definition of
birthright citizenship, Brannon writes:
[M]ere birth within American territory does not always make the
child an American citizen. He must be born within allegiance to the
United States, within its “jurisdiction.” Such is the case with
children of aliens born here while their parents are traveling or only
temporarily resident . . . . Such children are born within our
territory, and within our territorial jurisdiction, but not within the
pale of allegiance to us, as when born they are not subject to our
195
laws.

Thus, from a late nineteenth century legal perspective, it is
unlikely that Senator Johnson misspoke or confused two legal
principles into one. In fact, the debates on the birthright citizenship
clause 196 give further weight to the interpretation to which Johnson
sought to give credence—that the doctrine of allegiance is intimately
intertwined with the Plenary Power Doctrine, and grants Congress
large powers in defining who is a resident for apportionment purposes.

B. The Fourteenth Amendment Debates, the Plenary Power
Doctrine, and the Doctrine of Allegiance
For nearly a century, legal commentators have been asserting that
the Plenary Power Doctrine is a judicial fiction that is subject to the
limitations set forth in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 197 These claims are without legal or historical merit. 198

THE

194. HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1901).
195. Id. at 25.
196. See generally, Kelly Gindele, The Birthright of Citizenship as to Children Born of

Illegal Immigrants in the United States: What Did the Drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
Intend?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 367 (2007).
197. See Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of
Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51(1999); Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal
Regulations of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 862 (1989); Steven J. Burr,
Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1889 (1985); Karen Engle,
Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 59 (2004); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Nativism, Terrorism, and Human
Rights – The Global Wrongs of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521 (2000); Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the
Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important
Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833 (1997); Philip Monrad,
Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. L. REV. 831 (1989); David Moyce,
Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due Process Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CALIF.
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No empirical evidence exists that the Founding Fathers intended to
limit congressional authority over naturalization, citizenship,
immigration, or foreign affairs to the individual freedoms in the Bill
of Rights, especially the political rights of citizens. Congressional
plenary power in these areas was intimately intertwined with the
doctrine of allegiance and every nation’s right of self-preservation.199
The same holds true regarding the history of the Reconstruction
Congress, for the debates show that the drafters of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment were well aware of
congressional plenary authority over naturalization, immigration, and
the law of nations. As early as 1862, representative John Bingham
acknowledged congressional plenary authority over citizenship and the
constitutional restraints on this power, stating:
All from other lands, who, by the terms of [congressional] laws and
a [sic] compliance with their provisions become naturalized, are
adopted citizens of the United States; all other persons born within
the Republic, of parents owing allegiance to no other sovereignty,
are natural-born citizens. [There is] no exception to this statement
touching natural-born citizens except what is said in the Constitution
200
in relation to Indians.

Bingham’s statement is significant in many respects, but for the
purposes of this article it confirms that the doctrine of allegiance, as
prescribed by the political branches, was still prominent and
applicable. Throughout the 1866 debates over the Civil Rights Act and
Fourteenth Amendment, members of Congress spoke frequently of the
doctrine of allegiance in relation to congressional power over aliens—
both in terms of settlement and citizenship.
For instance, during the debates on whether to grant citizenship to
Freedmen, both those who were for and those who were against the
proposition attested to congressional plenary authority over aliens and
asserted arguments incorporating the tenets of the doctrine of
allegiance. Senator Peter Van Winkle stated that members of the
community have “the right to determine who shall be members of our
L. REV. 1747, 1773–76 (1986); Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to
Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the
Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769, 787–91 (1971); Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional
Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1982); W. Aaron Vandiver,
Comment, Checking Ideas at the Border: Evaluating the Possible Renewal of Ideological
Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 751 (2006).
198. Charles, supra note 33, at 4-38.
199. Id. at 23.
200. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong. 1st Sess., 1639 (1862).
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community.” 201 Senator Lyman Trumbull similarly declared that the
Constitution “vests in Congress the sole power of naturalization.” 202
Representative William Niblack203 defined congressional authority over
naturalization as only the “power to admit ‘aliens,’ that is, persons
born out of the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States, to
citizenship.” 204 Meanwhile, Representative William Lawrence declared
that Congress has the right to “declare that classes of people” become
citizens as “an exercise of authority which belongs to every sovereign
Power,” and is granted to Congress through the Naturalization
Clause. 205 Lawrence’s understanding of congressional authority over
aliens is of particular interest because he confirms that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not change the constitutional status quo:
As an alien may be deprived of all rights by law, and even excluded
from the country, it is the act of naturalization, the condition of
national citizenship, that confers on him the civil rights recognized
by the Constitution. It is citizenship, therefore, that gives the title to
these rights to all citizens. From the very nature of citizenship, the
avowed purpose of the founders of our Government, and the
interpretation put upon the Constitution, it must be clear that [the
Fourteenth Amendment] creates no new right, confers no new
privilege, but is declaratory of what is already the constitutional
206
rights of every citizen . . . .

During these debates, at no point did a member of Congress
declare that the 1866 Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment
altered congressional plenary authority over citizenship, naturalization,
immigration, or foreign affairs. In fact, the debates prove that such
plenary authority remained, for Congress saw such power as a “duty
to facilitate the belonging of people in [the] community.”207
Even the first sentence of Section 1 was merely declaratory of the
ancient doctrine of allegiance.208 Section 1 reads: “All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.” 209 As discussed below, the debates on this section show that
201. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., 498 (1866).
202. Id. at 1756.
203. Niblack went into great detail about the constitutional powers granted to define the
rules of citizenship, including citing Vattel and Kent’s Commentaries. See id. at 3211–17.
204. Id. at 3216.
205. Id. at 1832.
206. Id. at 1836.
207. Zietlow, supra note 36, at 1029.
208. Smith, supra note 36, at 1127–28.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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“subject to the jurisdiction thereof” was meant to address the longstanding doctrine of allegiance.
The doctrine of allegiance was the key to United States citizenship
in the late nineteenth century,210 for what would become Section 1
originally read: “All persons born in the United States, and not subject
to any foreign Power . . . are . . . citizens of the United States.” 211
Senator Justin Morrill stated that this clause confirms the “grand
principle both of nature and nations, both of law and politics, that
birth gives citizenship of itself.” 212 Senator Trumbull agreed and
elaborated on the clause in the paradigm of the doctrine of allegiance.
Trumbull stated, “My own opinion is that all . . . persons born in the
United States and under its authority, owing allegiance to the United
States, are citizens without any act of Congress.” 213 He would even
later state that this language “make[s] citizens of everybody born in
the United States who owe allegiance to the United States.”214
Representative Burton Cook understood Section 1 to “provide[]
that all persons born within the United States, excepting those who do
not owe allegiance to the United States Government” are citizens.215
Representative Wilson agreed, stating that the language was “merely
declaratory of what the law now is.” 216 Discussing the law of nations,
Blackstone, and American jurisprudence, Wilson elaborated, stating:
We must depend on the general law relating to subjects and citizens
recognized by all nations for a definition, and that must lead us to
the conclusion that every person born in the United States is a
natural-born citizen . . . except . . . children born on our soil to
temporary
sojourners
or
representatives
of
foreign
217
[g]overnments . . . .

The phrase “not subject to any foreign Power” was later
substituted by Senator Jacob Howard with “subject to the jurisdiction
thereof” in order to remove “all doubt as to what persons are or are
210. See Green, supra note 36, at 34–43 (discussing the allegiance for protection doctrine);
Zietlow, supra note 36, at 1030 (citizenship “implies a requirement of allegiance in exchange for
protection . . . because allegiance is a prerequisite for membership”). See generally, Mayton,
supra note 36.
211. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 542 (1866).
212. Id. at 570.
213. Id. at 527.
214. Id. at 572. See also id. at 1756 (Trumbull stated, “the prevailing opinion” is that “all
native-born persons not subject to a foreign Power are by virtue of their birth citizens of the
United States”).
215. Id. at 1124.
216. Id. at 1115.
217. Id. at 1117.
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not citizens of the United States.”218 Naturally, the substitution
sparked debate, including the issue of whether such language would
make citizens of persons born from sojourners, Indians, and
Gypsies. 219 Senator R. Doolittle made this query, stating that he
thought it was “exceedingly unwise” to adopt the “broad language
proposed.” 220 However, Senator Trumbull assuaged the fears of
Doolittle and the other members’ by confirming that the doctrine of
allegiance was still applicable in defining United States citizenship.
Trumbull stated that “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” meant “[n]ot
owing allegiance to anybody else.” 221 Senator Johnson elaborated:
Now, all this amendment provides is, that all persons born in the
United States and not subject to some foreign Power . . . shall be
considered as citizens of the United States. That would seem to be
not only a wise but a necessary provision . . . I know of no better
way to give rise to citizenship than the fact of birth within the
territory of the United States, born of parents who at the time were
222
subject to the authority of the United States.

Just as the Supreme Court would later confirm in United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 223 Trumbull and the Reconstruction Congress did not
view the change in language, from “subject to any foreign Power” to
“subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” as altering the definition of
Section 1 or congressional plenary power over naturalization,
immigration, or foreign affairs.224 Citizenship was still determined by
two constitutional rules. 225 First, the Constitution granted citizenship
218. Id. at 2890.
219. Id. at 2890–97.
220. Id. at 2893.
221. Id.
222. Id. See also BRANNON, supra note 194, at 25 (“[M]ere birth within American territory
does not always make the child an American citizen. He must be born with allegiance to the
United States, within its ‘jurisdiction.’ Such is the case with children of aliens born here while
their parents are traveling or only temporarily resident . . . . Such children are born within . . .
our territorial jurisdiction, but not within the pale of allegiance to us, as when born they are not
subject to our laws.”).
223. U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898) (“This sentence . . . is . . .
affirmative of existing law . . . in short, as to everything relating to the acquisition of citizenship
by facts occurring within the limits of the United States. But it has not touched the acquisition of
citizenship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be
regulated.”).
224. Id. at 675–76.
225. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 101–02 (1884). Charles Sumner viewed “subject to
the jurisdiction” as empowering Congress “to enforce this definition of Citizenship and this
guaranty, by ‘appropriate legislation.’” 14 CHARLES SUMNER, THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER
379, 385 (1883). The popular print culture reveals a similar interpretation. For instance, one
journal wrote, “If all who are born in this country are by this fact made subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, then there would be no use in naming this item as a condition
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to individuals that were born in the territorial United States “of
parents” 226 that had allegiance to the United States.227 Second, and
more importantly, all other obtainments of citizenship required
allegiance to government, which would-be citizens pledged by fully
subjecting themselves to the laws in compliance with congressional
plenary authority. 228 In other words, “subject to the jurisdiction
thereof” did not mean “territorial jurisdiction,” but “national
jurisdiction,” defined by submission to the laws of the land. An 1884
law review article by George D. Collins addressed this point:
The phrase in the above section “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”
does not mean territorial jurisdiction, as has been held in some
cases, but means national jurisdiction; that is the jurisdiction which a
nation possesses over those who are its citizens or subjects as such.
The phrase as used in the constitution was intended to have a
negative operation; that this is true, and that territorial jurisdiction
was not meant, is evident from . . . section 1, of what is known as
the “Civil Rights Bill,” and which was enacted by the same
Congress which framed and proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution; that section is as follows: “All persons born in the
United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
229
Indians not taxed, are declared citizens of the United States.”
of citizenship.” The Constitution and the Indians, 25 THE INDEPENDENT 964 (July 31, 1873). In
1877, Samuel Spears wrote, “The phrase ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ is a phrase of
limitation, intended to exclude certain persons from the classes specified.” Samuel Spear, 15
ALB. L.J. 484 (1877). Another 1877 editorial read: “This doctrine was not created by this
Amendment, since it had existed in the Constitution from the very commencement of the
Government and had been expounded and applied by the courts in enforcing individual rights.”
American Citizenship, 29 THE INDEPENDENT 16 (Aug. 23,1877).
226. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2893 (1866). See also Samuel T. Spear, Indians
Not Taxed, 32 THE INDEPENDENT 6 (Apr. 29, 1880) (Samuel Spear quoting James Kent, writing
an individual “may be born within the territory, but not within the ligeance [of the
government]”).
227. Elk, 112 U.S. at 102; see also Wood, supra note 21, at 506–10 (discussing the
importance of the doctrine of allegiance in determining birth right citizenship).
228. For instance, being born outside of the United States does not automatically grant
citizenship absent a law by Congress. See BRANNON, supra note 194, at 26 (“Suppose an
American citizen, native or naturalized . . . domiciled abroad, [has] children born abroad. Are
such children American citizens? They are not, because [they were] born abroad and not subject
to our jurisdiction. They come under the common law doctrine that all persons . . . born within
the territory of a nation are its citizens, by which rule a child born of alien parents domiciled
permanently in the United States is a citizen thereof.”).
229. George D. Collins, Are Persons Born Within the United States Ipso Facto Citizens
Thereof?, 18 AM. L. REV. 831, 837 (1884). For other late nineteenth century support for this
view, see G.M. Lambertson, Indian Citizenship, 20 AM. L. REV. 183, 185 (1866) (“‘[B]orn in
the United States’ means born, not alone on the soil of the United States, but within its
allegiance . . . . To be a citizen of the United States is a political privilege, which no one not
born in it can assume, without its consent in some form.”); D.H. Pingrey, Citizenship and
Rights Thereunder, 24 THE CENT. L.J. 540 (1887) (“subject to the jurisdiction thereof . . .
[means] persons born within the allegiance and jurisdiction of the United States are citizens
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It is a hard sell to assert that aliens who fail to comply with the
federal immigration laws fully submit themselves to the law.
According to the tenets of the doctrine of allegiance, this failure to
submit is a legal condition by which Congress could effectively
exclude unlawfully present aliens from apportionment. 230 To elaborate,
an alien’s failure to submit to the laws and declare his or her intent to
lawfully settle makes that individual still a subject of the foreign
jurisdiction from which he or she came, not the United States. To
come to any other interpretation conflicts with the well-established
plenary authority of the United States government to exclude and
expel aliens—a power that is inherent with every sovereign nation
through the right of self-preservation.
It should be emphasized that the right to be represented is a
political right, not a natural or civil right. The distinction is significant
because it was understood by the Founding Fathers that international
law grants nations the sovereign authority to restrict or exclude aliens
from political rights, including rights such as voting and bearing
arms. 231 There is no disputing that the Founding Fathers and the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to grant lawful aliens
the political right of apportionment. This is why the census has
traditionally included foreigners, residing with the intent to become
citizens, in the apportionment base. All other alien classifications,
however, could be denied this political right should Congress enact
legislation to that effect.
V. ONE STEP BACK, TWO STEPS FORWARD—THE FRAMERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ALLEGIANCE AFFIRMED
As the history above shows, the decision to include or exclude
unlawfully present aliens from the apportionment base is a political
issue that is at the discretion of Congress. The constitutional support
for such exclusion is based on the doctrine of allegiance as it was
understood by the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. 232

without reference to the political allegiance of their fathers.”); Irving Berdine Richman,
Citizenship of the United States, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 104, 114 (Mar. 1890) (stating that “subject to
the jurisdiction thereof” means “subject to the complete jurisdiction” and that “citizenship of the
United States, as now authoritatively defined, was not created by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, but has always existed since the adoption of the Constitution itself.”).
230. Adam C. Abrahms, Closing the Immigration Loophole: The 14th Amendment’s
Jurisdiction Requirement, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 469, 480 (1998).
231. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 33, at 26, 28 (addressing the right to
vote and the obtaining of rights by degrees); see also 1 U.S. Stat 271 (1792) (restricting the
political right to keep and bear arms in the national militia to citizens).
232. See supra Part IV.
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Opponents of this argument assert that “persons” should be construed
broadly 233 and that the Founding Fathers could not have foreseen the
illegal immigration problem today. 234 Therefore, opponents believe
that we should interpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s Apportionment
Clause to protect everyone, lawful or not.
What this argument fails to address, however, is that the Framers
intended for the doctrine of allegiance to be imbedded within the
Constitution itself. 235 Furthermore, the historical fact that the
Constitution was adopted to fix the disparities of states prescribing
different rules of citizenship236 supports the conclusion that Congress
has the authority to exclude unlawfully present aliens as a means to
maintain the integrity of the Union. While there is nothing in the
history of the Census Clause itself that would compel Congress to
exclude unlawfully present aliens from the apportionment base, the
doctrine of allegiance as understood by the Founding Fathers and the
history of the Naturalization Clause supports correcting the problems
that the apportionment of unlawfully present aliens presents.
Concerning the Naturalization Clause, it is often forgotten that the
disparity between the states regarding the rules of naturalization, and
the lenient granting of rights and privileges to aliens, was an
attributing factor in dispensing with the Articles of Confederation. As
early as April 1787, James Madison had written to George
Washington about the importance of “fixing the terms . . . and forms
of naturalization.” 237 It was a power that had to be placed in the hands
of the federal government in order to avert the States from
“harass[ing] each other with rival and spiteful measures” and to
prevent “the aggressions of interested majorities on the rights of
minorities and of individuals.” 238
The North Carolina Constitutional Convention supported granting
233. LEE & LUNDER, supra note 180, at 4.
234. Judith Lichtenberg, Within the Pale: Aliens, Illegal Aliens, and Equal Protection, 44
U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 375 (1983); Mary Romero, “Go After the Women”: Mothers Against
Illegal Aliens’ Campaign Against Mexican Immigrant Women and Their Children, 83 IND. L.J.
1355, 1379 (2008); Robert J. Shulman, Children of a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth

Amendment be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to
American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 669, 709 (1995).

235. The Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of allegiance in multiple cases. For
examples, see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655–67 (1898); Oh. ex rel.
Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 (1927); Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402, 412
(1925).
236. Charles, supra note 33.
237. JAMES MADISON, To George Washington, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON:
1783-1787, 346 (Gaillard Hunt ed., N.Y.) (1901).
238. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 593–94 (Gaillard Hunt & James Scott eds.,
1920). For a summarized history on this topic see KETTNER supra note 27, at 221–22.
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the federal government such plenary power as “the means of
preserving the peace and tranquility of the Union.” 239 The Convention
elaborated, stating that the “encroachments of some states on the
rights of others, and of all on those of the Confederacy, are
incontestable proofs of the weakness” of the Articles of
Confederation. 240 The need for federal plenary authority on
naturalization, immigration, and its impact on the States was further
discussed at the 1787 Constitutional Convention. For instance,
Madison viewed the Naturalization Clause as not only the power to
“fix different periods of residence,” but to also prescribe the
“conditions of enjoying different privileges of citizenship.”241
Madison believed any other interpretation of the Naturalization Clause
would prove dangerous and impede congressional authority to “confer
the full rank of citizens on meritorious strangers.”242
Naturally, the doctrine of allegiance was intertwined with the first
rules of naturalization and immigration. For instance, during the
debate of the 1790 Naturalization Act, Mr. Hartley hoped “some
security for [aliens’] fidelity and allegiance” would be required besides
a “bare oath.” 243 Another instance occurred in the debate over the
Alien and Sedition Acts when James Madison defended its
constitutionality. Madison knew that some were bold enough to
declare the Constitution’s “rights and privileges . . . cannot be at all
claimed by” aliens. 244 He disagreed. Madison responded by stating
aliens “are entitled” to the “protection and advantage” of the laws and
Constitution. 245 These protections, however, came under a condition—
239. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 19 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
240. Id. at 20. St. George Tucker phrased the problem as being “residence for a short time
[in one state] conferred all the rights of citizenship” in another. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A VIEW
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 190, 197 (Clyde N.
Wilson fwd., 1999). It did not matter that another State passed laws that “legally incapacitated”
aliens of “certain rights.” Id. For the law of the lenient state was “preposterously rendered
paramount” to the state that had adopted naturalization protections. Id. The second dilemma was
that the police power of the respective states was undermined. Id. The Articles granted the rights
of citizenship to citizens of any state. Id. The “laws of several states” that had been adopted to
create “descriptions of aliens” that had “rendered themselves obnoxious,” and the descriptions of
“other persons whose conduct had rendered them liable to the highest penalties of the law” were
“inconsistent, not only with the rights of citizenship, but with the privileges of residence.” Id. at
197–98. For similar commentary by the other early constitutional commentators see WILLIAM
RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 85 (2d ed., 1829);
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 537 (1833).
241. 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION
HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 398 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845).
242. Id.
243. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1109 (1790).
244. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 239, at 556.
245. Id.
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this being that aliens owe temporary obedience to the United States
and its laws. 246
One may ask, why is this history of the Naturalization Clause
important to the apportionment issue? The answer is simple. The
action of some local governments encouraging the settlement of
unlawfully present aliens through sanctuary policies ultimately
increases their respective State’s representative base. Just as the
Founding Fathers experienced problems with the varying rules of
naturalization affecting the granting of the rights of citizenship without
the consent of the Confederation, a similar dilemma presents itself
when states allow and encourage unlawful aliens to settle within their
respective borders. Without the consent of the Union, some localities
and municipalities are openly permitting and encouraging unlawful
aliens to settle, 247 thus granting them the conditional political privilege
of being apportioned and represented; all the while increasing their
respective State’s apportionment base.
Few will disagree with the proposition that apportionment and
representation for unlawfully present aliens is a political privilege, and
not a right as it is for lawful aliens. The constitutional question is
whether Congress has the inherent authority to strip unlawfully present
aliens of this privilege through the doctrine of allegiance. As
addressed above, the intent of the Framers in adopting the Constitution
and the Naturalization Clause undoubtedly supports this authority.
However, to fully understand the legal concept of allegiance, it is
important to appreciate the Framer’s understanding of it.

A. One Step Back—The Founding Fathers and the Doctrine of
Allegiance
The differentiation between the political rights of citizens and
those allotted to aliens existed well prior to the adoption of the
Constitution. In many ways, the Founders were influenced by English
statutes and precedent. 248 However, given the colonists’ grievances in
obtaining equal rights and citizenship for those individuals born in
England, the American model differed in some respects. In rendering
these differences, many of the Founders relied on the influential
writing of Emer De Vattel. 249
246. Id.
247. See Kris Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do to
Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 479-80 (2008).
248. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 33, at 21.
249. See 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1787). Vattel’s works were not translated into
English until 1787, but Benjamin Franklin’s correspondence reveals that Vattel’s treatise was
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Vattel’s influence on the Founders in framing the Constitution is
immeasurable. 250 His influence would have included the Founders’
understanding of the rules of naturalization (such as who may obtain a
country’s rights, privileges, and immunities), the laws of war, foreign
affairs, and immigration. Regarding immigration and entry, Vattel
viewed the admission of aliens as a privilege—not a right. 251 In
exchange for permission to “settle and stay,” aliens were “bound to
the society by their residence,” “subject to the laws of the state” and
“obliged to defend it, because it grants them protection.” Such
allegiances were required even though aliens did “not participate in all
the rights of citizens,” for the law of nations prescribed that
unnaturalized foreigners were “citizens of an inferior order,” and
“united to the society without participating in all its advantages.” 252
Naturally, such privileges and rights, whether political or civil,
depended upon whether an alien had settled. To accomplish the legal
requirement of settlement, Vattel writes that aliens must first establish
“a fixed residence in any place, with an intention of always staying
there.” 253 On its face this may seem like a broad allowance. However,
Vattel qualifies settlement by stating that a “man does not . . .
establish his settlement . . . unless he makes sufficiently known his
intention of fixing there, either tacitly, or by an express
declaration.” 254
To be precise, eighteenth century precedent required aliens to
prevalent among the Founders. In a letter to Charles Duman, Franklin wrote:
I am much obliged by the kind present you have made us of your edition of Vattel. It
came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary
frequently to consult the law of nations. Accordingly that copy which I kept (after
depositing one in our own public library here, and sending the other to the college of
Massachusetts Bay, as you directed) has been continually in the hands of the members
of our congress, now sitting, who are much pleased with your notes and preface, and
have entertained a high and just esteem for their author.
1 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, MEMOIRS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 297 (1834).
250. Andrew C. Lenner, Separate Spheres: Republicanism Constitutionalism in the
Federalist Era, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 254, 259 (1997); James H. Kettner, The Development of
American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The Idea of Volitional Allegiance, 18 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 208, 219 (1974); Andrew C. Lenner, John Taylor and the Origins of American
Federalism, 17 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 399, 406, 408, 411 (1997); JAMES H. KETTNER, supra note
27, 181, 188; PETER AND NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1776-1814, at 123–44 (1993). For examples of eighteenth
century analysis of these works by the Founding generation see generally TUCKER, supra note
240; THOMAS EVANS, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF VIRGINIA, RESPECTING THE ALIEN &
SEDITION LAWS (1798); OBSERVATIONS ON THE ALIEN & SEDITION LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1799).
251. 1 VATTEL supra note 249, § 213 (“The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are
foreigners, who are permitted to settle and stay in the country.”).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 218.
254. Id.
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announce their intent to settle. This legal premise has survived
throughout the world today, and is the entire basis of immigration law
as we know it. Most importantly, “announcing” one’s self to the
government is a legal premise that the Founders included in their first
laws regarding naturalization. 255 The Committee of the Judiciary in
1822 repeated this rule of law, stating “[t]o dispense with [the
declaration of the intent to settle] is to commit a breach in the
established system, and to make residence, without declared intention
to become a citizen, sufficient to entitle a person to admission” into
the United States. 256
Other eighteenth century commentators confirm the requirement of
allegiance to the laws and government as a prerequisite for aliens to
obtain certain privileges and rights. For instance, Joseph Yates, a
former Judge of the King’s Bench, transcribed the doctrine of
allegiance in his personal volume of Hale’s Pleas of the Crown. 257
Yates defined two types of allegiance—natural and local. Natural
allegiance was “that which is due from every man who is born a
Member of a society.” 258 Such allegiance was “perpetual &
Indefeasible and therefore the Allegiance arising from it is equally
perpetual & unalienable.” 259 Meanwhile, local allegiance was the
obedience that was due from aliens, foreigners, and sojourners while
present within the jurisdiction of the host nation. Yates described local
allegiance as follows:
Local Allegiance is that which is due from a Foreigner during his
Residence here; and is founded in the Protection he enjoys for his
own person his Family & Effects during the Time of that
260
Residence.

Yates was not the only prominent eighteenth century English judge
to observe the importance of allegiance and the “Law of Nations” in

255. 1 Stat. 103–04 (1790); 2 Stat. 153–54 (1802).
256. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UPON THE SUBJECT OF ADMITTING
ALIENS TO THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP WHO RESIDED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ONE YEAR
PRECEDING THE DECLARATION OF THE LAW WAR WITH GREAT BRITAIN (Mar. 1818, 1822).
257. Former Judge of the King’s Bench, Joseph Yates (1722-1770) kept a personal edition
of Matthew Hale’s Pleas of the Crown. It was rebound with blank leaves of paper placed in
between sections so that Judge Yates could scribble his own notes concerning the famous
treatise. See 1 JOSEPH YATES, MATTHEW HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed., 1759)
(available at Georgetown Law Center Special Collections). In 1873, the Supreme Court relied on
Hale’s Pleas of the Crown in confirming the doctrine of allegiance in relation to defining
residence. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 155 (1872).
258. 1 YATES supra note 257, at 1.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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the granting of rights and privileges to aliens. 261 William Blackstone
defined aliens as persons that are “born out of the king’s dominions,
or allegiance.” 262 Blackstone was well attuned to the fact that the
“law of nations” gave every nation the power “to take such measures
about the admission of strangers, as they think convenient.”263 This
power included conditioning rights and privileges on an alien’s
allegiance to the law or what Blackstone described as “behav[ing]
peaceably.” 264
The fact that the “law of nations” was of such importance to Yates
and Blackstone gives further credence to the importance of Vattel and
the law of nations as was understood by the Founding Fathers. In fact,
the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay, referenced
Vattel in a 1793 charge to the grand jury delivered in Richmond,
Virginia. Jay described Vattel as a “celebrated writer on the law of
nations” 265 when he delivered the following:
The respect which every nation owes to itself, imposes a duty on its
government to cause all its laws to be respected and obeyed; and that
not only by its proper citizens, but also by those strangers who may
visit and occasionally reside within its territories. There is no
principle better established, that that all strangers admitted into a
country are, during their residence, subject to the laws of it; and if
they violate the laws, they are to be punished according to the laws
266
. . . to maintain order and safety.

Perhaps what makes Jay’s charge of such importance was his
emphasis on the law of nations. It consists of “those laws by which
nations are bound to regulate their conduct towards one another” and
“those duties, as well as rights, which spring in relation from nation
to nation.” 267 These laws undoubtedly included every nation’s right
over aliens. According to Vattel, aliens that did not comport to the
laws of settlement were vagrants. They are individuals that “have no
settlement,” for to “settle . . . in a nation, is to become a member of
it, at least as a perpetual inhabitant, if not with all the privileges of a
261. Id. at 3.
262. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *366361(Oxford, Claredon 1765) . See
also 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 76 (6th ed., 1793) (“An Alien is
one born in a strange Country and different Society, to which he is presumed to have a natural
and necessary Allegiance.”).
263. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 262, at 251.
264. Id. at 252.
265. THE CITY GAZETTE AND DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, SC), August 14, 1793, at
2, col. 2.
266. Id. at col. 3.
267. Id. at col. 1.

80

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 25

citizen.” 268 Thus, what the Founders would have understood from
Vattel is that the law of nations required aliens to settle in order to
obtain the “privileges of a citizen.” That is what Vattel described as
the “tacit condition, that [they] be subject to the laws.”269
This includes naturalization and immigration laws “which have no
relation to the title of citizen, or of the subject of the state.” The legal
and philosophical justification for this “tacit condition” imposed on
aliens wishing to enjoy a nation’s rights and privileges was every
nation’s right of self-preservation. 270 Vattel elaborated on this point,
writing:
The public safety, the rights of the nation . . . necessarily require
this condition; and the foreigner tacitly submits to it, as soon as he
enters the country, as he cannot presume that he has access upon any
other footing. The sovereignty is the right to command in the whole
country; and the laws are not simply confined to regulating the
conduct of its citizens towards each other, but also determine what is
to be observed by all orders of people throughout the whole extent
271
of the state.

In sum, Vattel’s Law of Nations is considerable because it proves
that the legal basis of granting privileges and rights to aliens rests on
the doctrine of allegiance or what Vattel describes as the “tacit
condition” that they submit themselves to the laws. 272 Furthermore, it
gives us insight as to how the Founding Fathers would handle our
current dilemma of apportioning unlawful immigrants. Few will
dispute that the Founders intended to incorporate the Anglo origins of
the Plenary Power Doctrine. 273 Naturally, part of this Plenary Power
Doctrine is the power to define the rules regarding allegiance and its
relation to settlement for apportionment purposes.
However, as has been shown, there is another historical and
constitutional justification for excluding unlawfully present aliens from
the apportionment base—the intent of the Framers in adopting the
Naturalization Clause. 274 The inherent purpose of the Naturalization
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

1 VATTEL, supra note 249, § 219.
2 VATTEL, supra note 249, § 101.
Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 33, at 6, 34–35.
2 VATTEL, supra note 249, § 101.

Id.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 262, at 362; 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 395–98 (2d. ed., 1966).
274. See STORY, supra note 240, § 1099. Congressional power over naturalization “must be
exclusive; for a concurrent power in the states would bring back all the evils and
embarrassments, which the uniform rule of the constitution was designed to remedy.” Id. Any
doubts about concurrent power are removed because legislation by Congress on this matter is not
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Clause was to protect the political rights and privileges of the United
States citizen. Thus, it was not only drafted to establish “uniform
rules” on the obtaining of citizenship, but to protect the highly coveted
rights, privileges, and immunities of the United States. Certainly, one
of these coveted rights is the political right of apportionment and
representation.

B. Two Steps Forward—The Fourteenth Amendment,
Apportionment, Aliens, and the Doctrine of Allegiance
The Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens and aliens alike,
affording both the political right of apportionment. 275 For instance, all
persons are protected from being deprived of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law” 276 and from being denied the
“equal protection of the laws.” 277 The Fourteenth Amendment’s
drafters never disputed that basic protections of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law” extend to all individuals. They
are basic rights that Blackstone278 and Vattel 279 recognized as applying
to all foreigners entering a nation. Absent these natural and basic
rights, all other rights, especially the political privilege of
apportionment, stem from the doctrine of allegiance. However, in
order to exclude unlawfully present aliens from apportionment it
would take legislation from Congress, for the courts have repeatedly
held that this is a political question. 280
As addressed above, the doctrine of allegiance, the Framers’
understanding of this doctrine in the constraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the history of the Naturalization Clause all support
the constitutionality of legislation such as the Vitter Amendment.
Apportionment is a political privilege, and there is no disputing that
Congress has the plenary authority to enact legislation that
distinguishes the political privileges of aliens, especially those that do
not fully submit themselves to the laws. A brief examination of the
late nineteenth century treatises regarding citizenship and immigration
confirms this.
only “supreme law” by the language of the Constitution, but the courts also “firmly established
[the power] to be exclusive.” Id. § 1103. In other words, “[i]f each state had power to prescribe
a distinct rule, there could be no uniform rule.” Id. § 1104.
275. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
276. Id. § 1. These are basic rights that Blackstone described as being extended to all
persons—citizens and aliens alike. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 262, at 125.
277. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
278. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 262, at 125, 360.
279. 2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 249, §§ 103, 108, 109.
280. See supra Part III (beginning of).
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Returning to A Treatise on Citizenship, Alexander Porter Morse
writes that “certain natural rights [are] reserved to each individual in
the very compact itself by which civil society is formed.” 281 “It is a
doctrine of international law,” wrote Morse, “that each state
warrants . . . full and complete protection to the life, liberty, and
property of all the individuals within her jurisdiction.”282 Morse was
sure to distinguish these natural and civil rights from political rights,
stating that it is within the power of the nation to be the “sole judge,
regulator, and disposer” of all “other rights.”283 Furthermore even
when “rights and immunities [are] created by, or dependent upon, the
Constitution of the United States,” Morse writes, Congress may vary
such rights “to meet the necessities of a particular right.” 284
The Fourteenth Amendment did nothing to change this legal
understanding. 285 Members of the Reconstruction Congress repetitively
affirmed this to be true. 286 As Morse points out, the only effect the
Fourteenth Amendment had on the rights, privileges, and immunities
given to aliens was that it confirmed the status quo. 287 It reinforced
that states could not infringe on the basic civil rights of “life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law,” 288 the same rights that all
individuals were already entitled to receive according to international
precedent. 289
All other rights, privileges, and immunities in excess of the basic
civil rights of “life, liberty, and property” still required allegiance to
the laws. It is a requirement that aliens do not adhere to when they
enter the United States unlawfully and is the legal premise that permits
Congress to exclude unlawful aliens from the apportionment base. For
instance, in Alexander Cockburn’s 1869 work entitled Nationality, he
reasons “an alien is entitled to the protection of the country in which
281. MORSE, supra note 190, § 18.
282. Id. § 4; see also id. § 41.
283. Id. § 18.
284. Id. § 145.
285. The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment did not bestow any new rights, privileges,
or immunities upon the citizens of the United States or change how Congress may regulate
immigration. See supra Part IV.B; BRANNON, supra note 194, at 15, 19, 47 (“The
amendment . . . adds nothing to the catalogue of privileges, immunities, rights of life, liberty or
property, or of equality before the law. It does not specify or define any of them. It only defends
those rights existing under the law of the land, federal or state, and in being at its adoption, or
born of the law afterwards.”). For Supreme Court decisions, see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
448 (1890); Hurtado v. California, 83 U.S. 147, 537 (1872).
286. See supra Part IV.B.
287. MORSE, supra note 190, § 145.
288. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
289. MORSE, supra note 190, § 17 (“One of the accepted canons of modern private
international law is that the law of the nation to which an individual belongs decides if he is
native or alien . . . whether or not he enjoys civil rights [established] in the state.” ).
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he may be; and in return for this protection owes obedience to the
law, and temporary allegiance to the Sovereign or State.”290 Alexander
Porter Morse confirms this interpretation, stating, “protection and
allegiance are correlative terms” that “involve reciprocity.” 291 It is the
“obedience due by an alien to the laws of the jurisdiction in which he
happens to be commorant.” 292 In other words, as a condition for aliens
to possess political rights, privileges, and immunities, they can be
required to give temporary allegiance.
What is temporary allegiance and why is it significant for
apportionment legislation that may exclude unlawfully present aliens?
Temporary allegiance is the adherence to the laws of a nation,
including those “which do not relate specifically to [the nation’s] own
citizens.” 293 This is of considerable importance because any future
apportionment legislation concerning aliens can be conditioned on
allegiance to the immigration and naturalization laws. Naturally,
lawfully present aliens would comply with the doctrine of allegiance
because they announce to the government their intent to settle at a port
of entry, thereby adhering to the legal doctrine of temporary
obedience. Meanwhile, unlawfully present aliens would not qualify,
for their failure to submit themselves to the government and declare
their intent to settle would violate the doctrine of temporary
allegiance, so that they are not “entitled to a correspondent
protection.” 294
To be clear, unlawfully present aliens would automatically fail the
requirement of temporary obedience and allegiance because they enter
the United States in violation of the immigration laws. As Madison
argued, aliens that reside in violation of the law cannot be entitled to
the “protection and advantage” of the laws—federal or state. 295 This
would include most Article 4 Section 2 privileges and immunities,
because an alien must first give its allegiance to the national
government before being able to lawfully obtain the privileges of a
state. It may be argued, since the Constitution does not expressly state
aliens owe allegiance, that it is not a condition upon which Congress
may deny unlawful aliens the political privilege of apportionment. In
the words of William Rawle, the Constitution, however, does not give

290. ALEX COCKBURN, NATIONALITY: OR THE LAW RELATING TO SUBJECTS AND ALIENS
139 (1869) (emphasis added).
291. MORSE, supra note 190, § 74.
292. Id. § 128.
293. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 75 (O.W. Holmes ed., 12th ed.
1873).
294. Id. at 557.
295. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 239, at 556.
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a “definition of the nature and rights of citizens,” yet the “descriptive
term” used is a “plain indication that its meaning is understood by all,
and this indeed is the general character of the whole instrument.”296
Furthermore, the state constitutions in force circa 1868 support the
requirement of bona-fide lawful residence or the attainment of
citizenship to obtain certain rights and privileges. This is illustrated in
state constitutional analogues concerning the obtainment of real
property. For instance, many state constitutions such as Arkansas’s
prescribed, “Foreigners who are, or may become, bona fide residents
of this State, shall be secured the same rights in respect to the
acquisition, possession, enjoyment and descent of property as are
secured to native-born citizens.” 297 Mississippi’s 1868 constitution
granted a similar guarantee using the term “alien friends,” requiring
that “No distinction shall ever be made by law between citizens and
alien friends in reference to the possession, enjoyment, or descent of
property.” 298 Meanwhile, state constitutions such as Indiana’s only
enshrined the right of citizens to obtain state “privileges or
immunities.” 299 No mention was made of “people,” “inhabitants,”
“foreigners,” or “aliens.”
In sum, the historical and legal evidence clearly supports the
conclusion that the doctrine of allegiance was alive and well at the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Aliens entering the United
States 300 and residing in any state of the Union must first pledge due
allegiance to the former in order to enjoy the legal protections of
296. RAWLE, supra note 240, at 85.
297. ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 20. Similar provisions were present in other State
constitutions. See CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. I, § 17; FLA. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 17; IOWA
CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 22; MICH. CONST. of 1850 art. XVIII, § 13; NEV. CONST. of 1864 art.
I, § 16.
298. MISS. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 22.
299. IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 23. A similar provision was included in other State
constitutions. See IOWA CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 6; OR. CONST. of 1857 art. I, § 21.
300. For the requirement of allegiance to obtain protection of the laws of the United States,
which would include the states, see De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 80 (1901) (“The
inhabitants of [occupied] territory would . . . owe[] temporary allegiance to the United States
such as aliens within its jurisdiction now owe it.”); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649, 657 (1898) (quoting A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 173–77, 741 (1896)) (“‘[A]n alien who, because he is within the British
dominions, owes ‘temporary’ allegiance to the Crown.’”); Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S.
147, 154–55 (1873) (“The alien, whilst domiciled in the country, owes a local and temporary
allegiance, which continues during the period of his residence. This obligation of temporary
allegiance by an alien resident in a friendly country is everywhere recognized by publicists and
statesmen . . . [Secretary of State] Mr. Webster . . . said: ‘Every foreigner born residing in a
country owes to that country allegiance and obedience to its laws so long as he remains in it, as
a duty upon him by the mere fact of his residence, and that temporary protection which he
enjoys, and is as much bound to obey its laws as native subjects or citizens. This is the universal
understanding in all civilized states, and nowhere a more established doctrine than in this
country.’”).
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either. 301 The doctrine of allegiance has deep roots in English
history 302 and is, in fact, the entire basis of obtaining legal
citizenship. 303 Blackstone even referenced the doctrine, writing, “[It
is] due from an alien, or stranger born, for so long time as he
continues within the king’s dominion and protection.” 304 Other support
for the doctrine of allegiance can be found in the political writings of
William Cobbett—a famed English political commentator. While
residing in America as an alien in 1817, Cobbett remarked of the
allegiance due from himself. “I owe a temporary allegiance to [the
United States], and am bound to obey its excellent laws and
Government,” wrote Cobbett. “All this I owe in return for the
protection I receive.” Cobbett would go on to write that he owed a
“great gratitude to [the] sensible and brave people [of the United
States] and to their wise, gentle, and just Government . . . I owe to
them my freedom at this moment.” 305 In 1829, Maryland professor
David Hoffman also recognized the temporary allegiance doctrine,
stating aliens may be subject to lawsuits because “they are temporarily
in the country, in which . . . they owe a temporary allegiance, and are
bound to submit to its laws.” 306
Finally, in his 1829 Treatise of Universal Jurisprudence, John
Penford Thomas writes that the rights of aliens exist “whilst they obey
the laws.” 307 Aliens are bound to temporary allegiance—”the condition
of sufferance on which alone [an alien] can be allowed to remain.” 308
It is an allegiance that requires a country’s “express recognition; in
return for which [an alien] pledges his allegiance.”309 However, even
absent this allegiance, “aliens are generally liable, during their stay
. . . to the operation of the laws.” Like James Madison before him,310
Thomas knew these legal principles were “sometimes of unequal
301. RAWLE, supra note 240, at 89, 98; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 262, at 371. For early
state laws—preceding the Constitution—requiring allegiance by aliens, see KETTNER, supra note
27, at 214, 221.
302. This English history was understood in the popular print culture of the
Reconstruction. See Aliens, THE ALBION 484 (Oct. 12, 1867).
303. See 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES § 372 (1803) (“Thus
allegiance . . . both express and implied, is the duty of all the king’s subjects, under the
distinctions here laid down, of local and temporary, or universal and perpetual. Their rights are
also distinguishable by the same criterions of time and locality; natural-born subjects having a
great variety of rights, which they acquire by being born within the king’s ligeance”).
304. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 262, at 358.
305. 5 WILLIAM COBBETT, SELECTIONS FROM COBBETT’S POLITICAL WORKS 207 (John M.
Cobbett & James P. Cobbett eds., 1835) (emphasis added).
306. 1 DAVID HOFFMAN, LEGAL OUTLINES 217 (1829) (emphasis added).
307. JOHN PENFORD THOMAS, TREATISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE 338 (1829).
308. Id. at 143.
309. Id.
310. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine, supra note 33, at 27–28.
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operation; but the inconvenience must exist.” “There is no injustice in
this rule,” wrote Thomas, because “its infraction is much more likely
to cause evils than its observance.” 311
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is not permissible to challenge in litigation the
apportionment of unlawfully present aliens for congressional
representation, this does not mean that Congress cannot pass
legislation doing so. Such legal challenges are doomed to fail not only
because it is nearly impossible to obtain standing, but also because the
history of the Apportionment Clause does not compel the Census
Bureau to distinguish between aliens and citizens. The drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment lumped together men, women, minors, and
aliens in their understanding of “whole people.” However, at the same
time, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent
Congress from excluding unlawful aliens from the apportionment base,
for its drafters understood that such political privileges were subject to
allegiance and subjecting one’s self fully to the laws. Therefore,
through congressional plenary authority over naturalization,
immigration, and foreign affairs, the doctrine of allegiance affords
Congress a constitutional vehicle to pass legislation that excludes
unlawful aliens. Naturally, Congress will not pass such legislation on
its own. It will require state legislation, such as Arizona SB 1070 or
ordinances excluding aliens from local apportionment bases, to bring
the issue to the forefront.

311. THOMAS, supra note 307, at 340.

